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Abstract 
Radar surveillance systems, in both airspace and maritime domains, are facing increasing challenges 
in dealing with objects that cannot be detected by traditional transponder-based radar surveillance 
technologies. These objects, including birds, weather, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), hot 
balloons, are labeled as non-cooperative objects. In order to prevent ambiguity and confusion for 
human operators using the surveillance data non-cooperative objects are commonly treated as 
unwanted clutter and removed from the displayed data. 
However, the omitted information of non-cooperative object can be critical to aircraft safety. With 
new developments in technology and radar capabilities, it is possible to detect these non-cooperative 
objects and consider how to distribute relevant information about them to human operators 
throughout a system. The research goal of this thesis is to identify the human factors challenges in 
future radar surveillance systems where non-cooperative object information is distributed to both air 
traffic controllers and pilots.  
In order to achieve the goal, the thesis first constructed a model of surveillance information 
distribution in current ATC operations and a model of surveillance information distribution in the 
expected future operational environment. The expected future surveillance information distribution 
model was then carefully examined to identify potential human factors challenges in the non-
cooperative object information distribution process. Two of the identified challenges (non-equal time 
delay and information level of details) were studied in depth through conducting human-in-the-loop 
experiments and online surveys.  
The results of an asynchronous information (non-equal time delay) static simulation environment 
experiment showed that while a delay in the non-cooperative object information would lead to 
observable but not statistically significant longer communication time, it does have a significant 
effect on number of clarification statements – with an increase of time delay, more clarifications were 
made. A survey of controller and pilot perceptions of maximum acceptable delay showed no 
significant differences in the average maximum acceptable delay reported by controller (20.5 
seconds) and pilot (13.64 seconds) participants. Future research should consider adopting dynamic 
simulation environment, subject matter experts and shorter delay intervals to identify an acceptable 
delay threshold. 
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The survey results also demonstrated that there are more controllers and pilots who have had 
encounters with UAS in their daily tasks than what was originally expected. The survey also helped 
identify operational information requirements and availabilities for individual UAS and challenges in 
sharing non-cooperative object information between controllers and pilots. 
These findings are quite valuable as they provide guidance on future radar surveillance systems 
design in supporting the effective distribution of non-cooperative object information. Future work 
should complete the analysis of the survey and create more dynamic environment for studying 
information asynchrony. 
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On January 15, 2009, an Airbus A320-214 with 155 people on board was on its way to Charlotte from 
New York City when it struck a flock of Canada Geese during its initial climb out. The plane lost 
both of its engine power and took a forced landing on the Hudson River. The incident is known as the 
famous “Miracle on the Hudson.” In later reports and analysis, it was concluded that “the ingestion of 
large birds into each engine, which resulted in an almost total loss of thrust in both engines” (NTSB, 
2009) is the probable cause of the accident, and the First Officer was the first one who saw the birds 
approaching, not the air traffic controller. 
These large birds were detected by current technology, but were not visible to either the air traffic 
controller or the pilot. This is an illustrative example of challenges for designing displays for complex 
radar surveillance systems with multiple types of data. There is a clear need to understand the 
operators’ information needs, and how the information should be displayed in improving, not 
hindering, their task performance. 
1.1 Current Surveillance Systems and Challenges 
Radar surveillance systems, in both airspace and maritime domains, are facing increasing challenges 
in dealing with objects that do not have transponders and/or do not cooperate with human operators 
(air traffic controllers). These objects, including birds, weather, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), 
hot balloons, are recognized as non-cooperative objects. In order to prevent human operators’ 
ambiguity and confusion in the subsequent analysis, the non-cooperative objects are mostly viewed as 
clutter and/or removed from the displayed data (i.e. US Airways Flight 1549 Accident). 
However, the omitted information can be critical to aircraft safety. According to Dolbeer, Wright, 
Weller and Begier (2012), there are more than 121,000 wildlife strikes records during the past twenty 
years. From 2006 to 2010, 26 strikes were reported on a daily basis. One might argue that the 
collisions between birds and aircraft are usually minor. Yet, the experience of US Airways Flight 
1549 over the Hudson River, as described at the beginning of the chapter, demonstrates that non-
cooperative objects could severely endanger aircraft and the lives of passengers. 
In addition to the dangers presented by birds, there is also an increasing demand to use unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS) in commercial applications. Since the introduction of UAS, the main focus 
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has been on military applications. Yet, driven by the huge profit opportunities in the UAS market, it is 
inevitable that the sky will eventually open up to UAS. Airline companies, research institutions, 
governments and other organizations are already planning to introduce UASs to the airspace 
(Dalamagkidis, Valavanis, & Piegl, 2008a, 2008b); this interest is also reflected in recent policy 
discussions in the United States that have been driven by privacy fears due to the expanding use of 
UAS by law-enforcement agencies.  
The expanded use of UAS will require an integration of their operations into airspace actively 
managed by an air traffic controller (“controlled airspace”). However, due to the fundamental 
differences between UAS and manned aircraft (Dalamagkidis et al., 2008a), it is unclear how UAS 
operations in controlled airspace would affect the pilots and controllers’ communication and task 
performance. For example, there is a need to understand better how UAS operations will be different 
from traditional flight operations, and if and how those differences affect the information 
requirements for air traffic controllers and pilots.  
1.2 New Technologies and Potential Opportunities 
Recently, a number of new surveillance capabilities (i.e. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast equipped UAS) have been developed, and radar manufacturers are continuously working to 
improve existing capabilities. Applying this technology to UAS creates new opportunities to improve 
the quality and timeliness of surveillance information used for real-time decision-making, enhances 
the performance of air traffic management systems, and could help facilitate the integration of UAS 
into controlled airspace. 
Other advances in surveillance and communication operational concepts are creating opportunities 
to expand the distribution of ground-based surveillance data about UAS to include both pilots and 
controllers. For instance, System Wide Information Management (SWIM) (Eurocontrol. SESAR 
Consortium, 2007; NASA, 2008) is a concept for an information subscription and distribution system 
that would allow users from different locations to access the same information. It greatly reduces the 
information transmission time and the complexity of the system. 
1.3 Challenges in Information Distribution 
The improvement of technologies and capabilities not only present opportunities, but also bring 
potential human factors challenges.  
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First, the new technologies create potential challenges in punctual and accurate information 
sharing. The future air traffic management platforms, such as SWIM, would be able to facilitate 
information sharing among multiple users. However, for users accessing the same information from 
different physical locations, it is unclear what would happen if the information flow were disrupted.  
It is unclear how the users would react to the information disruption and the potential for differential 
information delays, with users collaborating while having access to the same information at different 
points in time. There could be substantial impact on the effectiveness of information sharing, leading 
to potential confusion and communication frustration. 
Secondly, it is not yet clear how UAS activities should be effectively managed. Incidents reported 
to NASA’s Aviation Safety & Reporting system (ASRS) highlight concerns about what information 
about nearby UAS is available to pilots and/or controllers, and what information about the nearby 
UAS they need (ASRS CALLBACK Issue 397, 2013). This raises the issue of what information 
about a UAS, and at what level of detail, should be displayed to the other human operators (pilots and 
controllers) in the aviation system. 
Guided by the two major concerns, the goal of the research presented in the thesis is to identify the 
potential human factors challenges in the future environment where non-cooperative information is 
distributed to both controllers and pilots, understand how the challenges affect human operators’ 
performance, and provide guidance for future radar surveillance systems design.  
The specific objectives of the thesis and the approach to accomplish them are shown as follows: 
Objective 1: Create a surveillance information distribution model of current ATC environment 
capturing current challenges in handling non-cooperative object surveillance data.  
In order to achieve the objective, a literature review on past publications of bird-strike forecasting 
systems, hazardous weather warning systems and UAS detection and integration technologies was 
performed. A current surveillance information distribution model was built on the basis of the review 
findings and it is presented in Chapter 3. Yet, with the development and introduction of new 
technologies, services and operational concepts, there was a need to expand and adapt the old model 
to be representative of the anticipated future environment. As such, it leads to the second objective of 
the thesis; 
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Objective 2: Create a surveillance information distribution model of future ATC environments 
incorporating emerging technologies relevant to handling non-cooperative object surveillance data.  
Literature reviews on recent research about advanced radar capabilities and new infrastructure 
design were performed. They provided a better understanding of the future ATC environment and 
were used to create a future information distribution model presented in Chapter 3. The model 
illustrates a different non-cooperative information distribution process compared with the current 
model. This difference provided a basis for identifying research needs and opportunities on relevant 
human factors challenges. 
Objective 3: Identify potential human factor challenges in distributing non-cooperative 
information in the future operational environment.  
In order to identify the human factors challenges, the future surveillance information distribution 
model was critically examined to identify high impact consequences of changes in information 
distribution on the human operators in the system. A literature review on related human factors 
challenges in communication, information sharing and information perception was conducted in 
support of the identification of challenges.  The identified challenges led to additional objectives 
specific to each challenge. 
Objective 4: Determine how non-equal time delays (HF challenge 1) in the distribution of non-
cooperative object radar surveillance information affects the communication between controller and 
pilot.  
An initial experiment was designed and performed as a stepping-stone towards understanding the 
potential effects of asynchronous information on controller-pilot communication. The amount of the 
delay time was manipulated to identify the correlation between information asynchrony and 
operators’ task performance. An online survey of pilots and controllers was also used to understand 
the challenges in sharing non-cooperative object information between controllers and pilots. 
Objective 5: Gather information requirements from air traffic controllers and pilots on individual 
UAS operations  (HF challenge 2).  
The same online survey study mentioned in Objective 4 was also used to accomplish the fifth 
objective. Certified air traffic controllers and pilots were invited to participate in the study and share 
their insights on UAS operation in the controlled airspace. 
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1.4 Thesis Organization 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review contains a review of previous work on systems handling non-
cooperative objects, advanced radar capabilities, and systems architecture and infrastructure 
design for distributing surveillance data. Related human factors challenges are briefly 
discussed. Parts of Objectives 1 and 2 will be achieved in this chapter. 
 Chapter 3: Surveillance Information Distribution Model & Human Factors Challenges 
presents two models for current and future ATC operations respectively. Four human factors 
challenges are identified in the future surveillance information distribution model. The 
challenges of information asynchrony and information level of details are discussed in details 
in Chapter 4 and 5. The remainder of Objectives 1 and 2, and Objective 3 will be achieved in 
this chapter. 
 Chapter 4: Initial Study of Information Asynchrony presents an experiment investigating 
the effect of asynchronized information on controller-pilot communication (HF challenge 1). 
The chapter describes the methodology and design of the experiment, reports the results and 
discusses the implications of the study. Objective 4 will be achieved in this chapter. 
 Chapter 5: Survey on Information Level of Detail presents a survey study investigating 
operators’ UAS information requirements and availability (HF challenge 2) and challenges in 
sharing non-cooperative object information between controllers and pilots (HF challenge 1). 
Detailed design process, structure of the survey and survey implementation are described. 
Results of the survey are reported and analyzed based on the structure. Objective 5 will be 
achieved in this chapter. 
 Chapter 6: Conclusion & Implications summarizes the findings of this thesis and proposes 
areas for further research.   
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter provides a review of previous research work in distributing non-cooperative object 
information in current radar surveillance systems. Work in several areas was reviewed: (2.1) 
advanced radar capabilities, (2.2) current technologies and systems in handling non-cooperative 
objects, including birds, weather and UAS, (2.3) infrastructure service for information centralization, 
and (2.4) potential human factors challenges in radar surveillance systems. 
In the remainder of this chapter, each of the areas above is discussed. The literature review was 
conducted by reviewing past publications, technical reports, and news reports. The sources include 
the UAS / Europe Air Traffic Management Research & Development Seminars, Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society (HFES) proceedings and journals, Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE) proceedings, and FAA publications. 
2.1 Advanced Radar Capabilities 
There are two types of air traffic control surveillance systems– primary surveillance radar and 
secondary surveillance radar. Primary surveillance radar (PSR) returns both cooperative and non-
cooperative target information based on the objects’ energy reflection, whereas secondary 
surveillance radar (SSR) requires the object to be equipped with an on-board transponder so that it 
can receive and reply signals (Trim, 1990). 
In the famous US Airways Flight 1549 Hudson River Accident, the accident report shows that 
there were radar data from the EWR and JFK airports indicating the airplane’s designated path 
“intersected a string of unidentified primary targets” (NTSB, 2009). The radar system in this accident, 
ASR-9, is capable of providing limited primary surveillance data and sufficient secondary 
surveillance data. Yet, the LGA departure controller chose to filter these “uncorrelated” primary 
returns in order to focus on the more important targets (NTSB, 2009).  
As demonstrated by the Hudson River Accident, current radar surveillance capabilities are 
advanced in a way that they enable effective cooperative target tracking and communication. One of 
the most widely used radar surveillance systems in the United States in Terminal Radar Approach 
Control (TRACON) facilities – the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement Systems (STARS) –
   7 
is capable of tracking up to 1,350 airborne aircraft (cooperative objects) simultaneously in a terminal 
area and displaying 6 levels of weather (non-cooperative objects) data in color.  
Beyond radar technologies, data link is also becoming one of the widely used technologies. 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Service-Broadcast 
(TIS-B) are two great examples of data link technology. While ADS-B uses transponders to broadcast 
aircraft position, TIS-B collects SSR information and sends it out to aircraft with the capabilities of 
receiving ADS-B information. Although these technologies are more accurate in reporting positions, 
ADS-B has been identified as flawed in its security mechanism (Costin & Francillon, 2012). In 
addition, for aircraft that are not equipped with transponders, such technologies are not effective. 
Therefore, there is still a need for enhanced radar surveillance technology that would accurately 
detect and transmit non-cooperative object information to both controllers and pilots. 
2.2 Technologies and Systems for Handling Non-cooperative Objects 
In order to better understand the requirements of distributing information on non-cooperative objects 
in radar surveillance systems, previous work on bird strikes monitoring and reporting systems, 
weather surveillance systems, and the integration of UAS into controlled airspace was reviewed. 
2.2.1 Birds 
Bird-strike has always been one of the hot research topics in airspace safety due to its potential 
catastrophic damage to the aircraft in close encounter accidents/incidents. The wildlife-strike database 
in the FAA has collected over 120,000 strikes during the past two decades. From 1988 to 2010, 
wildlife strikes had killed more than 229 people and destroyed over 210 aircraft worldwide, and the 
threat is increasing (Dolbeer et al., 2012). In early studies of world-wide bird flock risks to aircraft, 
Allan, Bell, and Jackson (1999) pointed out the lack of a complete and accurate bird strike database at 
that time, and predicted that having a complete bird strike database would help to make the 
monitoring of bird movement much easier. Over the past decades, a number of models and systems 
have been developed as tools to monitor bird activities, predict potential bird migrations, and set 
alarms when potential hazards are spotted. These models and systems are discussed in the remainder 
of this section. 
The US Bird Avoidance Model (US BAM) is a quantitative model based on the strike records in 
the FAA wildlife strike database and is used for assessment of potential hazards (Zakrajsek & 
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Bissonette, 2002). It uses Geographic Information System (GIS) technology for “analysis and 
correlation of bird habitat, migration, and breeding characteristics to produce a bird-strike risk 
surface” (Kelly, 2005). In 2005, US BAM was integrated with the Avian Hazard Advisory System 
(AHAS) (Kelly, 2005). 
AHAS is the main bird-strike risk management tool used by United States Air Force (Kelly, 2005). 
It integrates information from Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD), weather forecasts and 
known bird distributions (Kelly, Merritt, Donalds, & White, 1999). The system itself provides 24-
hour bird migration forecast, 24-hour soaring activities forecast and near real time bird activities 
forecast. Its nowcast has an update rate of one hour (Ruhe, 2005). An important advantage of AHAS 
is that it provides a near real-time monitoring and frequent updating of current bird activities, and the 
information is posted via the Internet at hourly intervals. However, this approach is too restrictive 
when it comes to military training, because the flight schedules are made according to the forecast of 
bird activities with a possible error ranging from a few hours to a month (Kelly, Merritt, White, 
Smith, & Howera, 2000). Moreover, as operational environment becomes increasingly complex, the 
update rate is still too long and introduces too much uncertainty for real time bird avoidance 
maneuvers. 
Similarly in Europe, there are also a couple of different bird strike forecast models and systems 
(Ruhe, 2005). For instance, BIRDTAM is a bird migration observation and warning system 
developed by the German Military Geophysical Service (Ruhe, 1999). The system provides a regular 
bird strike forecast (daily forecast for 24 hours, and twice a week forecast for 3 days) for low-level 
military missions and instant warnings to relevant personnel (Ruhe, 1999). Even though its data 
gathering and processing is automatic, there is still additional need for human analysis and 
interpretation (Ruhe, 2005). 
In addition to the forecasting systems used for a broader range of area like AHAS and BIRDTAM, 
some risk analysis systems are designed specifically for the need of the terminal area. For example, 
the Lévy Flight Model could effectively provide information including “bird mass, flight speed, flight 
direction and its position in relation to the runway”(Ning, Wang, & Chen, 2013).  
These bird-strike databases and forecasting systems are great sources for providing valuable 
information on bird migration patterns and high-risk bird activities. However, there is a disconnection 
between en-route and airport bird strike forecast. There also lacks a real-time bird-strike warning 
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system and emergency reaction mechanism would enable prompt information sharing between the 
pilots and air traffic controllers regarding the potential hazards.  
2.2.2 Weather 
Hazardous weather is another category of non-cooperative objects. According to the statistics 
published by the FAA, weather is responsible for about 70 percent of the delays in the NAS (Kulesa, 
2003). Moreover, it contributes to enormous economic loss, aircraft damage, passenger injuries and 
unexpected operating costs (Kulesa, 2003). Among all the weather conditions, convective weather is 
the most damaging and dangerous one. The common convective weather conditions include hail, 
lightening, tornadoes, thunderstorms, heavy precipitation, icing and wind shear.  
The Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) is a weather information network that uses 
advanced weather surveillance radar in the United States. It collects important weather information 
and translates it into a mosaic map for human operators in the system. Since its deployment, 
NEXRAD has greatly improved the accuracy of remote sensing and warning of the environment 
(Klazura & Imy, 1993). 
A couple of examples of NEXRAD information applications that greatly benefit aviation safety are 
the Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) and Corridor Integrated Weather System (CIWS). 
ITWS was initiated by the FAA to address the airport terminal area weather issues. It merges data and 
information from FAA and several National Weather Service (NWS) sensors (including NEXRAD) 
to provide accurate weather forecasts for terminal operations (Evans & Ducot, 1994). Its information 
consumers include air traffic controllers, supervisors, pilots and airline dispatch (MIT Lincoln Lab, 
2013). Similarly to ITWS, CIWS also has an access to a wide variety of sensors, and the information 
is distributed to controllers, pilots and airline dispatch. In addition, it provides accurate and swift 3-D 
weather information and forecasts, and information is used for pilot avoidance of storms model 
construction (Evans & Ducot, 2006).  
NEXRAD images are now also available in cockpit. However, it is possible that the pilots could 
misinterpret the information due to lack of knowledge and experience (Vincent, Blickensderfer, 
Thomas, Smith, & Lanicci, 2013). As clarified by the National Transportation Safety Board (2012), 
there could be an extreme latency (15-20 minutes) in the weather information displayed in the 
cockpit. Without knowing the limitation, pilots could have incorrect perception and assumptions of 
the situation. 
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Another limitation of NEXRAD is information discrepancy. Although both pilots and controllers 
have access to NEXRAD information, they may not be seeing the same thing (Brown, 2007). It could 
be caused by information delay, information pre-process and unreliable detecting capabilities, which 
could result in poor situation awareness and communication. 
2.2.3 Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
2.2.3.1 Current Situation 
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are becoming an increasingly important class of aircraft in the 
airspace. The success of using UAS in military applications demonstrated its great advantages and 
potential. Meanwhile, more focus has also been given to UAS in civil aviation, such as traffic 
surveillance, post-disaster assessment, and scientific research. However, the use of UAS in civil 
aviation is currently very limited by the strict rules of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
(Dalamagkidis et al., 2008a). This is mainly because the FAA believes that UAS technology is still 
not mature enough to be incorporated into current National Airspace System (NAS) (Babbitt, 2009), 
and the FAA needs to ensure that the development and employment of UASs will not jeopardize the 
current users in the NAS. 
In 2011, the FAA announced plans to gradually open the U.S. sky for UASs and integrate UASs 
within the NAS (Griner, 2011). As an initial step, the FAA certified two UAS models to operate 
along the Alaska coast for civil aviation purposes (The Associated Press, 2013). Recently, the FAA 
released its five-year roadmap for UAS regulations (FAA, 2013). Yet, as described in next two 
subsections, a seamless integration still requires a lot of work to be done. 
2.2.3.2 Integration Challenges 
The integration of UAS is facing two main challenges: the capability of Sense and Avoid, and 
communications.  
The biggest concern of UAS comes from its fundamental difference in sense-and-avoid capability 
from traditional manned aircraft. Sense and avoid refers to aircraft’s capability of reliably detecting 
and avoiding intruding aircraft. Some of the major research trends include 1) creating a 
platform/concept to support overall situation awareness where data from different sources will be 
merged, and 2) equipping the UAS with on-board transponders to enable Detect-Sense-and-Avoid 
(DSA) capabilities (Tirri, Fasano, Accardo, Moccia, & Lellis, 2012).  
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As part of the first research trend, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
introduced a Sense and Avoid (SAA) concept that enables self-separation and collision avoidance 
(Consiglio, Chamberlain, Munoz, & Hoffler, 2012). Pérez-Batlle, Pastor and Prats (2012) also 
proposed a set of pre-planned separation maneuvers that would improve both air traffic controllers 
and UAS pilots’ situation awareness. The researchers also explored the options of using ground-based 
radar to provide UAS sense and avoid information. These concepts are promising and worth more 
exploration; in the meantime, researchers should keep in mind how these pre-set concepts affect pilots 
and controllers’ workload. 
Current DSA technologies fall into two main categories – cooperative and non-cooperative 
technologies. Cooperative technologies include the Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS), Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Advisory System. Most 
of these technologies are already being widely used in human-in-the-loop manned aircraft. However, 
before applying them to UAS, they need to be verified that they also meet the specific requirements 
of UAS operation. Non-cooperative technologies, on the other hand, consist of radar, laser, sonar, 
electro-optical, infrared and acoustic, and do not require a human operator in the loop. The limitation 
of non-cooperative technologies is the ranging capabilities and resolution requirements (Hottman, 
Hansen, & Berry, 2009). 
A fair amount of effort has also been put into modeling what size of UAS vehicles would require 
DSA capabilities. For example, Weibel and Hansman (2006) previously considered the risks of both 
midair collisions and subsequent ground impact as a function of UAS size. Multiple approaches have 
been used for calculating and mitigating potential collision hazards between two UASs, including 
using probabilistic trajectory models and Monte Carlo simulations (Kim, Park, & Tahk, 2007), using 
the geometric relations between two UASs to calculate the point of closest approach (Park, Oh, & 
Tahk, 2008), and relying on cooperative predictive control algorithm to avoid static obstacles (Boivin, 
Desbiens, & Gagnon, 2008).  For small UAS particularly, Tirri et al. (2012) pointed out that adopting 
particle filtering could achieve multi-sensor data fusion for getting a more accurate estimate of the 
collision threat.  
The second main challenge – communications – is essential as well, as UAS need to constantly 
transmit large amounts of data to ground stations. Communication presents a challenge on currently 
assigned radio frequencies due to bandwidth limitations (Griswold, 2008). Research has been focused 
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on validating new UAS spectrum and data link communications. For instance, Jain and Templin 
(2011) proposed to use dual-band design where L-band and C-band are being considered instead of 
using the single-band design. McHenry et al. (2010) introduced a Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) 
concept where the radio frequency spectrum is monitored, and available spectrum is identified and 
allocated based on pre-programmed rules. In the meantime, NASA has been funding a 
Communications Subproject to analyze and obtain appropriate frequency spectrum allocations for 
safe operations of UAS (NASA, 2013). 
2.2.3.3 Other Concerns and Next Steps 
Other than the technical challenges, there are a few other concerns in UAS integration. One of them is 
the different behaviors of different types of UAS. Some large UAS will operate in a manner very 
similar to manned aircraft in current operations; on-board transponders and real-time two-way 
communication links between controllers and operators will provide the basic capabilities of 
surveillance and communication with the UAS. However, for small and medium size UAS that do not 
have the same on-board capabilities, additional limitations in communicating and implementing 
control instructions may create the need for controllers to treat some UAS in a manner similar to 
birds, weather, or other non-controllable objects. The significant research efforts placed on having a 
UAS operator be responsible for multiple UAS may exacerbate this need (Cummings, 2004). 
At the same time, air traffic control systems around the world are being transformed with new 
technological capabilities and new operational concepts. New communication frameworks such as 
System Wide Information Management (Meserole & Moore, 2007) are creating opportunities to 
rethink the distribution of surveillance information. In particular, “who needs to know what, and 
when do they need to know it” about UAS operating in close proximity to other aircraft is the main 
challenge. 
As part of assessing the potential and challenges of distributing ground-based surveillance data 
about non-cooperative objects, such as UAS, Yuan et al. (2012) previously proposed the future 
surveillance information distribution model described in Chapter 3. The model was used to identify 
four human factors challenges that might be created by sharing surveillance data gathered from 
ground-based systems, such as primary or secondary radar, with both controllers and pilots. These 
challenges, described more fully in Chapter 3, were: impact of time delays between information 
available to pilots and that available to controllers (Yuan, Histon, Burns, Waslander, & Dizaji, 2013), 
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appropriate level of detail (e.g. information requirements) of surveillance data presented to pilots 
and/or controllers for decision making, the potential for dissonance, or inconsistent and contradictory 
warnings from two or more alerting systems due to multiple sources of surveillance data, and the 
effect of target not being continuously detected on operators’ information perception. 
2.3 Infrastructure Service for Information Centralization 
In addition to developing new technologies and radar capabilities, infrastructure services are also an 
important component in successfully distributing non-cooperative object information. One of the new 
infrastructure designs is System Wide Information Management (SWIM). SWIM is an information 
subscribe-and-distribute service, facilitating shared situation awareness among different applications 
and operators in the system (Meserole & Moore, 2007). It is adopted by both Single European Sky 
ATM Research (SESAR) and Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) (Ulfbratt & 
McConville, 2008). 
More specifically, SWIM provides 5 core services: interfaces, registry services, message broker 
services, information assurance and system management (Stephens, 2006). Each of the services 
covers a unique part of the information exchange process in SWIM. Stephens (2006) conducted a 
thorough review of SWIM security architecture and concluded that information exchange will only 
occur “when it is authorized and when the information can be sufficiently protected by the system.” 
During the past couple of years, SWIM has gradually transitioned from a concept design to 
implementation. Besada and fellow researchers (2012) deployed ADS-B in an air-inclusive SWIM 
environment. The results are quite promising and showed that such an implementation of ADS-B can 
“fulfill the most demanding surveillance accuracy requirements.” Other work has been trying to 
establish a general SWIM model that is usable for various simulation analyses. For instance, 
Balakrishnan et al. (2012) proposed a simulation model of SWIM that can be used to evaluate its 
capability in facilitating increasing performance demands from the users. Similar models could be 
used to analyze the effectiveness of distributing UAS information in the surveillance system. 
SWIM is now in the phase of Segment 2 implementation, which provides enterprise messaging 
capabilities. It has been used in the Network Enabled Operations program where simulated UAS 
flights were generated for research of UAS integration into the National Airspace System. 
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SWIM provides a promising future of information sharing within the complex ATC systems. In 
Chapter 3, it is specifically discussed and envisioned as the core infrastructure design for future radar 
surveillance systems. 
2.4 Related Human Factors Challenges in Surveillance Systems 
During the past couple of decades, researchers have also looked beyond the technologies and into the 
human component in the surveillance systems. They have previously identified a fair number of 
potential human factor challenges, which would have a great impact on the air traffic controllers and 
pilots in the system. Some of the major issues that are of particular interest to this thesis project 
include situation awareness, display clutter and information latency. 
2.4.1 Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness (SA), as defined by Endsley (1988), is “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 
projection of their status in the near future.” SA is a relatively well-researched and documented area. 
Related studies have dived into fields of commercial pilot information requirements (Endsley, Farley, 
Jones, Midkiff, & Hansman, 1998), automated flight control and its reliability (Hollands & Wickens, 
1999; Mouloua, Gilson, & Hancock, 2003), multimodal displays for UAS pilots (Arrabito et al., 
2010; Ruff, Calhoun, Draper, Fontejon, & Guilfoos, 2004; Tvaryanas, 2004), and pilot interface 
design (Quigley, Goodrich, & Beard, 2004).  
Automation can improve as well as hinder operators’ performance and perception of information; 
as the automation increases to a certain level, there is less interaction between the operators and the 
system, which in turn reduces their awareness of the situation. Multimodal displays and interface 
design (visual, auditory and tactile information) is another very promising area, especially for UAS 
controls. In the longer term, this research should also take vigilance decrement and operator fatigue 
(Arrabito et al., 2010) into account. Meanwhile, given the current transformation of ATC systems, it 
is also critical to understand how system design potentially affects operators shared situation 
awareness and information requirements on non-cooperative objects (FAA, 2013; Langan-Fox, 
Sankey, & Canty, 2009). 
Most of current research on UAS related situation awareness mainly focuses on enhancing UAS 
see-and-avoid capabilities. In other words, advanced UAS see-and-avoid capabilities can supplement 
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UAS pilots’ loss of visual cues in order to perform avoidance maneuvers as manned aircraft (Melega, 
Lazarus, Lone, & Savvaris, 2013). For instance, McAree and Chen (2012) proposed artificial 
situation awareness where a manned aircraft’s future trajectory is projected. UAS pilots can then see 
the projections and make corresponding maneuvers.  
In terms of UAS information display regulations, currently there is insufficient or no guidance on 
how it should be displayed and what information should be displayed to controllers in the system. 
NASA did briefly give an example of UAS traffic display to manned aircraft in a presentation 
(Johnson et al., 2012). There is, however, no written documentation on this matter. 
2.4.2 Display Clutter 
Display clutter is another important human factors issue closely related to operators’ information 
perception and decision-making. Future concepts of air traffic management require advanced 
technologies to support operators’ situation awareness and performance, but they may also bring up 
new challenges of presenting too much information to the operators, which would in turn cloud the 
operators’ information perception and decision-making. As indicated by different sources of research, 
cluttered displays would hinder the pilots’ detection of command changes and traffic (Ververs & 
Wickens, 1998),  and extremely cluttered displays would cause higher workload and less stable 
performance (Kim et al., 2011).  
While there is plenty of research done examining the effect of visual clutter, it is more important to 
understand how the systems/displays should be designed to minimize the negative effect of clutter 
and provide the operators with sufficient information. Doyon-Poulin, Robert and Ouellette (2012) 
conducted a thorough literature review on visual clutter and identified three key indicators of visual 
clutter as “the amount of information, the relevancy of the information and the presentation or 
organization of the information.” Based on this categorization, they also proposed three design 
solutions to de-clutter: minimizing the quantity of the information, highlighting task-related 
information, and mapping the relationship between different information. Color-coding can reduce 
the complexity of ATC display to a certain degree (Ahlstrom & Arend, 2005; Yuditsky, Sollenberger, 
Della Rooco, Friedman-Berg, & Manning, 2002). 
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2.4.3 Information Latency 
Effective communication is built on top of accurate and prompt information sharing. Ambiguity, 
errors, and miscommunications between pilots and controllers are all potential causes of accidents 
(Morrow, Lee, & Rodvold, 1993). An important factor affecting communications is the presence of 
time delays (Morrow et al., 1993).  
Information delay could create challenges around communicating target locations and confusion 
generated by the presence of time delays. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued safety 
alerts on this matter about the use of NEXRAD mosaic image by pilots (National Transportation 
Safety Board, 2012). Day, Holt and Russell (1999) studied the effects of delayed visual feedback and 
found that it produced oscillations in control movements and targeting exercises. Outside of the air 
traffic control domain, Kraut, Gergle and Fussell (2002) have examined the effect of time delays in a 
contrived jigsaw puzzle collaboration task with a shared visual display. Introducing a delay of as little 
as 3 seconds in the task was reported to impact performance and “in many cases rendered the shared 
visual space useless” (Gergle, Kraut, & Fussell, 2006). 
Besides information delay, there are potential challenges about communication itself as well. 
Rantanen, McCarley and Xu (2002) looked into the communication delay and identified that a delay 
on the pilots’ side in responding to controllers’ instruction (pilot delay) has a significant effect on 
controller performance, whereas the delay of transmitting controllers’ instructions to the cockpit 
(audio delay) does not affect pilots’ performance accuracy.  
Ultimately, controller-pilot communications are important for maintaining consistent and accurate 
mental models of the traffic situation for both the pilot and the controller (Mogford, 1997). The 
shared mental model between pilots and controllers will include weather, traffic, intent and effective 
states (Farley & Hansman, 1999). Farley and Hansman (1999) experimentally studied the effects of 
increased sharing of weather and traffic data between pilots and controllers; however, this previous 
work assumed that information sharing would be instantaneous and did not examine the effects of 
differing time delays in access to shared information. 
New technologies and concepts, such as SWIM, are creating opportunities to broader information 
sharing between pilots and controllers (Ulfbratt & McConville, 2008). Thus, it is fundamental for 
future radar surveillance systems to address the challenges created by non-cooperative objects 
information latency in order to improve operators’ shared situation awareness and communication. 
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2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examined four aspects of radar surveillance systems– advanced radar capabilities, 
current technologies and systems for handling non-cooperative objects, infrastructure services for 
information distribution and related human factors challenges in current surveillance systems. Current 
technologies can, to a certain degree, provide near-real time warnings of potential hazards caused by 
non-cooperative objects. Past research of ATC has identified potential human factors challenges, 
including situation awareness, display clutter and information latency. With the emerging new 
capabilities and technologies (i.e. ADS-B, SWIM), these issues should be carefully studied and 
addressed in order to improve the overall efficiency and safety of future surveillance systems. How 
the implications are tied with distributing non-cooperative information in future surveillance systems 
is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 
Surveillance Information Distribution Models & Human Factors 
Challenges 
In order to better understand the information flow of radar surveillance systems and identify 
associated human factors challenges, the first part of the chapter presents the process of developing 
existing and future surveillance information distribution models based on previous literature review. 
The second half of the chapter discusses the identification of human factors challenges based on the 
model of expected future information distribution. 
3.1 Surveillance information distribution models 
Chapter 2 discussed the current operations in radar surveillance systems. The understanding of those 
systems was used to develop a surveillance information distribution model, which captures how 
cooperative and non-cooperative surveillance data are currently distributed. The advanced 
technologies and concepts that will be used in future ATC identified in Chapter 2 were incorporated 
into a second surveillance information distribution model, the model of expected future operational 
environment. This model was then used as basis for identifying human factors challenges of 
distributing non-cooperative object information that might be expected to be present if the advanced 
technologies are deployed. 
3.1.1 Current Surveillance Information Distribution Model 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 2, the current surveillance information distribution model in 
current air traffic control operations is shown in Figure 3-1. Key aspects captured in the model 
include the fact that pilots do not have direct access to radar data (neither non-cooperative nor 
cooperative object information), and they negotiate and respond to clearance modifications from air 
traffic controllers when a potential hazard is identified. Pilots have the potential of directly observing 
non-cooperative objects and cooperative objects outside the aircraft. Due to the scope of the thesis, 
pilots’ visual detection of cooperative objects was not depicted in the model and considered in the 
thesis. There are many limitations of visual detection, and it is especially difficult depending on 
aircraft geometry and behavior, nighttime and weather conditions. Even if the weather were clear, 
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aircraft speeds and competing task obligations of the pilots, would also limit their awareness of the 
non-cooperative objects.  
 
Figure 3-1. Current Surveillance Information Distribution Model 
3.1.2 Model of Expected Future Surveillance Information Distribution 
As discussed in Chapter 2, although the deployment of any enhanced surveillance technology is 
several years away, a number of new concepts and techniques for bird strike avoidance, aircraft 
tracking and system integration have been developed in several undergoing projects. These projects 
have the potential to eventually change the surveillance data distribution shown in Figure 3-1. It will 
be important to assess and understand how these changes might affect human operators’ performance. 
In order to identify expected human factors challenges, the current surveillance information 
distribution model has been expanded based on anticipated enhancements and new technologies that 
are in development.  
A new surveillance information distribution model incorporating the core ideas behind the System 
Wide Information Management (SWIM) architecture was developed and is presented in Figure 3-2. 
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The model can be used to better understand the collaboration needs and impacts of new information 
sources on the relationship between controllers and pilots.  
As shown in Figure 3-2, the ground-based radar surveillance system is responsible for detecting 
non-cooperative and cooperative objects, and transmitting the radar data to SWIM, which publishes 
the data to a data fusion and process center. The processed data are subscribed by SWIM from the 
data fusion and processing center and subsequently published through distinct and different 
information channels to different users (e.g. pilots and controllers).  
As demonstrated, the non-cooperative information is displayed to pilots and controllers, 
introducing additional collaboration and sharing information considerations. Information derived 
from surveillance objects can be used as inputs into automated avoidance systems that are granted 
authority to maneuver an aircraft without requiring coordination with pilot or controller.  
 
Figure 3-2. Model of Expected Future Surveillance Information Distribution 
The key difference between current and future surveillance information distribution models is 
pilots’ access to cooperative and non-cooperative object radar surveillance data facilitated by SWIM. 
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It enables pilot-controller information sharing on non-cooperative objects and could potentially 
improve operators’ situation awareness. 
3.2 Identification of Human Factors Challenges 
The projected future environment creates opportunities to distribute enhanced surveillance data on 
non-cooperative objects; however, there are also challenges that will need to be overcome and key 
questions that need answering. Key human factors challenges were identified by studying the non-
cooperative information distribution process in future operational environment and reviewing past 
literature on related human factors issues. 
3.2.1 Potential for Asynchronous Information for Air Traffic Controllers and Pilots  
The first area identified was the potential for asynchronous information to be shared between 
controllers and pilots. As illustrated in Figure 3-2, with the SWIM architecture the information on a 
non-cooperative target is published to SWIM and then to pilots and controllers. It is possible to 
hypothesize a scenario where a pilot receives the UAS warnings from the pilot information 
distribution system (Figure 3-2), and they need to confirm with a controller about the intention, speed 
and controlling status of the UAS.  
However, since the controller is receiving the information through a different distribution system 
(air traffic controllers’ information distribution system which is displayed as ATCos information 
distribution system in Figure 3-2), there may be different inherent time delays and, potentially, 
differences in presentation and awareness of the information. The asynchronocity could be caused by 
several factors, including hardware design (i.e. the means for transferring the information), software 
design (i.e. system process speed), human operation (i.e. controllers’ or pilots’ current workload and 
tasks) and human cognitive complexity in processing the information. The cognitive complexity, as 
defined by Scott (1962), is “the number of independent dimensions-worth of concepts the individual 
brings to bear in describing a particular domain of phenomena.” In the field of air traffic control, the 
cognitive complexity refers to the “measure of the difficulty that a particular traffic situation will 
present to an air traffic controller” (Meckiff, Chone, & Nicolaon, 1998). Human operators’ cognitive 
complexity increases with the growth of traffic situation difficulty, which might contribute to a more 
sever asynchronous information perception.  
   22 
Given that pilots and controllers might not have the same, up-to-date information, it is expected 
that the communication will be passive and ambiguous, i.e. pilots and controllers would not have the 
same sense of situation in one conversation. As identified by Mosier et al. (2013), different 
information is one of the resulting factors of conflicts, which would disrupt communication on traffic 
flow. Even when operators have access to the same information, there might be a time delay in when 
the information becomes available resulting in reaction delays. This is seen in current operations 
where differences in weather presentation (as derived from aircraft weather radar radars and as 
derived from ground based weather radars) can lead to confusion and communication challenges 
(Hansman & Davison, 2000). Additionally, if there are no synchronous standards for warning and 
alert generation, pilots and controllers may be under different impressions as to the urgency of the 
situation.  
This motivates identification of an area of further research – identifying the thresholds of 
acceptable time-delays for information presented to controllers and pilots. It is important to determine 
how much delay can be tolerated before normal task performance is affected. It can economically 
minimize the risks and hazards that are brought by the time difference in receiving information.  
3.2.2 Displayed Information Level of Detail 
A second key area identified is in specifying how data on the non-cooperative objects should be 
displayed to pilots and controllers. Decision-making is greatly dependent on the process and 
evaluation of the given information, and information visualization is an important, and challenging, 
aspect of the process (Griethe & Schumann, 2005). For pilots or controllers to make a decision with 
respect to the non-cooperative objects, some basic information can be identified as being necessary: 
size/threat level, current location, velocity, and potentially acceleration and/or intent information if 
available.  
Enhanced surveillance capabilities may allow very precise resolution of non-cooperative objects, 
with the possibility of identifying individual small birds, or individual UASs within a swarm. 
However, it is not clear that this resolution is operationally needed, nor what the consequences of 
providing too high a resolution of the objects might be. Providing too much detail, for example 
individual objects for each bird within a flock, or each micro UAS within a larger swarm, could 
overwhelm the pilot or controller with information; on the other hand, individual objects may be more 
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meaningful, particularly for correlating with other data sources such as an out-the-window view for 
the pilot.  
Secondly, there will be a remaining degree of uncertainty associated with any surveillance system. 
This can be due to inherent limits of the technology, or time delays in processing, distributing and 
displaying the information. In the context of rapidly maneuvering objects, it will be important to 
consider how to show the limits on the precision of any identified objects, and what uncertainty 
remains about the relative position.  
Finally, other display issues that were identified included depiction of relative altitude of non-
cooperative objects, showing intent information (if available) and the level of confidence in it, and 
communicating the degree of cooperation that might be expected of the object.  
3.2.3 Dissonance and Warning Integration  
The third key area identified was the challenge of integrating warnings and alerts generated based on 
non-cooperative target information with existing on-board warning systems. The challenge is the 
potential for dissonance, or “a situation in which information from two or more alerting systems have 
content or representations that suggest different timing or actions to resolve a hazard” (Song & 
Kuchar, 2003).  
Warning dissonance increases the complexity of the system and presents challenges on human 
operators’ alert perception and execution. Alerting systems are considered as a contributing factor to 
avionics systems complexity due to different alerting mechanisms and sensors (Kaygusuz & Uyar, 
2011). As identified by Dehais et al. (2012), warning dissonance is the primary reason for pilots’ lack 
of reaction to alarms. The conflict and inaccuracy of the information reduces operators’ trust in the 
warnings. Thus, non-cooperative object warning systems should be cautiously designed in accordance 
with existing warning systems, and the sensor accuracy should be at the same level as the rest of on-
board warning systems.  
Modality is one of the approaches used to reduce operators’ workload and improve situation 
awareness. For instance, Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS) and Traffic Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) display the alarm in both audio and visual contexts. Theoretically, such a 
design should assist pilots in quick and accurate decision-making. Yet, in reality, pilots are required 
to confirm the alarm by visual identification of the hazard outside the window (Cleveland, Fleming, 
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& Lee, 2011). Earlier research (Pritchett & Hansman, 1997) shows that even when the confirmation is 
not specified by the system, pilots were still more willing to confirm the alert or take the alert as a cue 
to perceive more information, rather than taking orders from the alarm system directly. Essentially, 
operators’ are concerned about the accuracy of the information. 
3.2.4 Information Intermittency 
The final key area identified is the potential for information intermittency, which may happen when 
an object is operating near the limits of detectability for a surveillance system, and the object may not 
be continuously detected. It can cause an object to appear and disappear from a surveillance and/or 
navigation display. 
Information intermittency can be considered as disruption and interruption. It presents various 
challenges on different stages of information perception and decision-making, including information 
pre-processing, prioritization and attention, information confidence level and information 
interpretation (Endsley & Jones, 2001). It is likely to increase operators’ workload and reduces 
situation awareness. In certain cases, the operators may not even be aware that they do not have the 
accurate and entire information of the situation (Beasley et al., 2011). 
One of the frequently occurred intermittency effect concerning UAS is loss of link between UAS 
and ground station control personnel (Kaste, Archer, Neville, Blickensderfer, & Luxion, 2012; 
Walters, Huber, French, & Barnes, 2002). It is recommended that human-machine interface be 
improved in detecting and responding to link loss. However, there is not much literature on how often 
the intermittency occurs, and how it could potentially affect communication and other operators’ 
performance when non-cooperative object information intermittency is involved. Therefore, there is a 
need to take an initial investigation in understanding the frequency of information intermittency in 
current ATC system, the average data loss period, and the mitigation strategies of information 
intermittency that best support operators’ needs. 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
The third chapter presents a current and future ATC surveillance information distribution models. 
With the deployment of new technologies and concepts, there are also emerging human factors 
challenges. A thorough examination of the expected future surveillance information distribution 
model revealed four major challenges in the process of distributing non-cooperative object 
   25 
information, including the potential for asynchronous information, displayed information level of 
detail, dissonance and warning integration, and information intermittency. Each of the challenges is 
elaborated in depth. For the purpose of the thesis, the challenges of potential for asynchronous 
information and displayed information level of detail are selected as the main investigation focus. The 
following chapters present how these two challenges are approached and examined in details with 
experiment and survey. 
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Chapter 4 
Initial Study of Information Asynchrony 
As identified in Chapter 3, asynchronous information in the radar surveillance systems could 
potentially trigger miscommunication and confusion. This is already seen in current operations with 
respect to the presentation of weather information to pilots and controllers.  Don Brown, a retired 
former air traffic controller, pointed out in his blog Say Again? #71 (Brown, 2007) that a controllers’ 
weather display is not as accurate as people would think. It not only leaves out important information 
about the weather (i.e. altitude), but is also turned off to guarantee successful aircraft separation most 
of the time. There can also be substantial multiple minute delays in the NEXRAD weather image 
presented to a controller (Brown, 2007).  Contrast this with the out-the-window view of weather that 
pilots can obtain and the potential for miscommunication and confusion is clear.   
The introduction of new electronic means of distributing weather to the cockpit is also creating 
further potential for confusion.  According to a report released by the National Transport Safety 
Board (National Transportation Safety Board, 2012), the weather information displayed to pilots in 
the cockpit can be delayed as long as 15 to 20 minutes.  This is a great example of the existence of 
information asynchrony in current surveillance systems and how it can reduce overall system 
performance. In order to understand how the information delay affects operators’ performance, 
Chapter 4 presents an initial experiment in a simplified environment systematically varying the time 
delay between pilots and controllers in order to investigate the effect of asynchronous information on 
controller-pilot communication.  
The remainder of the chapter presents the experiment methodology, scenario design, experimental 
tasks, analysis results, and concludes with discussion and implications. 
4.1 Goal 
While there has been significant previous work on controller-pilot collaboration, there does not 
appear to be much data available on how differential time delays in a common information source 
affect the communication and collaboration between pilots and controllers. The goal of the 
experiment is to take a first step in examining asynchronous information’s effect on operators’ 
communication. It aims to extract meaningful results that can verify the hypotheses and be used as a 
stepping-stone towards a more sophisticated study that would form part of future work. 
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4.2 Experimental Design 
4.2.1 Methodology 
The experiment investigated three hypotheses: 1) increasing time delay would cause an increase in 
the amount of clarifying communications between controllers and pilots; 2) increasing time delay 
would increase the amount of time taken to coordinate a resolution to an impending conflict in the 
traffic situation; and 3) increasing time delay would decrease self-assessed performance, and would 
be positively correlated with self-assessed measures of frustration and task difficulty. 
In the experiment, participants were shown static pictures of a radar surveillance display (controller 
participant) and a primary navigation display (pilot participant). Their tasks were to observe the 
displays, identify potential conflicts and communicate with each other to resolve the conflict. The 
experiment manipulated the amount of time delay present between the information presented to the 
controller participant and the pilot participant. It was also possible that there was no time difference 
between the two parties’ information. 
The goal of the experiment is to quickly verify the influence of delayed information on 
communication. Therefore, participants do not have to have professional experience in air traffic 
control or as a pilot. Observation, post-trial questionnaires and audio recording were used to facilitate 
the analysis of the data. Dependent and independent variables are discussed in Chapter 4.2.5. 
4.2.2 Experimental Setup 
The task was setup to resemble current controller-pilot voice communications. A divider was placed 
between the two participants (Figure 4-1) allowing them to communicate verbally but without being 
able to see the other person or any gestures. The researcher sat in the same room with the participants, 
controlling the static pictures displayed for both participants through a desktop computer connected to 
two external monitors.  
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Figure 4-1. Experiment room setting 
4.2.3 Participants & Training 
Access to trained professionals was not possible; instead, students from a local university were 
recruited as participants. Consequently, the participants were expected to be not as familiar with air 
traffic control and piloting operations. However, for the purpose of the intended task, it was felt that 
the core goal of communicating to negotiate a coordinated resolution to a conflict did not require 
specialized knowledge. Since the participants were naïve, multiple training trials were provided to 
make sure that the participants were capable of reading the display, analyzing potential conflicts and 
communicating with each other.  
As part of the training protocol, participants were taught to recognize the legends (aircraft icon, 
non-cooperative objects icon, etc.) and understand the information presented on the displays. Training 
on how to communicate was provided; 4 sets of static displays were used to illustrate to participants 
on how to communicate regarding potential conflicts. By the end of the training session, participants 
were given some time to get familiar with the setting and their newly acquired knowledge, and to ask 
the researcher questions. When the participants indicated that they were confident and comfortable 
with the tasks, the study would proceed onto the experimental tasks stage. 
Participants were comprised of 12 pairs (12 female and 12 male participants) with an average age 
of 29.5 years old. In order to control for possible effects of gender, there were three “male – male” 
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groups, three “female – female” groups and six “female – male” groups. Participants were assigned to 
the pilot and controller roles randomly at the start of the experiment and remained in the same role 
throughout the entire experiment. Participants did not previously know each other.  
4.2.4 Scenario Design 
Ten different scenarios were 
designed; five were distinct takeoff 
scenarios and five were distinct 
landing scenarios. Each scenario 
constituted a distinct arrangement 
of traffic, weather, and airspace 
details.  The scenarios were 
designed so that while they were 
distinct and would appear novel to 
participants. They would also be of 
equivalent difficulty and be 
expected to produce similar 
communication patterns between 
pilots and controllers.  
Each scenario had either 1 or 2 
impending conflicts between the 
pilot’s aircraft and birds and/or 
UAS and/or weather condition. 
Scenarios differed in the location 
of potential conflicts (i.e. in one scenario, participants would see the weather condition directly in the 
front, whereas in another scenario, the bad weather is approaching from the right side). 
For each scenario, pictures for the pilot participant and controller participant were generated using 
a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Figure 4-2 presents an example of the static images used in one 
scenario for the controller and pilot. The common elements shown on both images included 
traditional aircraft, as well as depictions of birds, weather and UAS. On the controller’s radar 
surveillance display, airway, airport and sector were shown. Controllers were also notified of the 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Controller View (Top), Pilot View (Bottom) 
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general traffic situation in their controlled sector by a short briefing message displayed on the screen. 
On the pilot’s navigation display, the same elements were shown from the pilot’s point of view.  
4.2.5 Time Delays 
Five delay intervals were used in the study: 0 (i.e. no delay), 0.5 minute, 1 minute, 5 minute and 10 
minutes. While 10 minutes is an extreme case of the potential time delay, it is helpful to magnify the 
effect of asynchronous information on communication and test the hypotheses. 
Using a random assignment process, each time delay was uniquely associated with one takeoff 
scenario. A separate random assignment process uniquely associated each time delay with one 
landing scenario. For each scenario, the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet provided the ability to apply the 
delay to only the non-cooperative objects for either the controller display or the pilot display. This 
allowed for the creation of distinct “controller ahead” and “pilot ahead” versions of the scenarios. The 
complete mapping of time delays, “who is ahead”, and scenario is shown in Table 4-1. 
The delay interval was applied to the non-cooperative objects (UAS, birds and weather 
information) for either the controller or pilot display, but cooperative objects (e.g. other aircraft) were 
presented on both pilot and controller displays with no relative time delay. The purpose for this 
design was to present participants with novel and engaging situations in each trial while at the same 
time minimizing the potential for differences in the surrounding environment and details of the traffic 
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Table 4-1: Mapping of Scenarios to Time Delays and “Who is Ahead” 
   
Time Delay (Minutes) 
   
0 0.5 1 5 10 












































































































  A (S1_T) (6)         
B (S2_T)  (2) (3)       
C (S3_T)    (3) (2)     
D (S4_T)      (3) (1)   













F (S1_L) (4)         
G (S2_L)  (3) (2)       
H (S3_L)    (2) (3)     
I (S4_L)      (2) (4)   
J (S5_L)        (3) (2) 
4.2.6 Assigning Participants to Scenarios & Time Delays 
The full set of combinations of time delay, “who is ahead” and trial order was impractically large to 
counterbalance for all possible combinations. Unfortunately, the exact process of assigning pairs to 
scenarios and time delays was not preserved and is not available at the time of writing. However, 
some considerations were documented and are explained below.  
The within-subject experimental design included one independent variable (time delay) and six 
dependent variables (communication time, number of clarification statements, performance, 
communication, frustration and level of difficulty). Each pair of participants performed each of the 
five possible time delays once. To minimize potential learning effects, the sequence of time delays in 
the experimental trials was randomized. 
There were equal numbers of pilot-ahead and controller-ahead trials for each pair, and all of the 
trials were randomized between takeoff and landing scenarios. The reason for such a design was to 
counter balance “who is ahead” across all of the trials while providing novel scenarios for the 
participants. Therefore, “who is ahead” is not considered as a contributing factor in the analysis. 
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Ten experimental packages, each representing a unique assignments of trial order, time delay, 
“who is ahead”, and scenario type (takeoff/landing) were designed and are shown in Table 4-2. Each 
pair of participants performed one experimental package. For each package, Table 4-2 sets the 
sequence of the scenarios, “who is ahead” and if it is takeoff or landing environment. For example, in 
Package 1, the first trial presents a takeoff scenario of a 0.5-minute time delay where the pilot 
participant has the more updated information. 











 0 / T 1 C T 5 P L 10 C L 
2 5 C T 0.5 C L 0 / L 10 P T 1 P T 
3 0 / L 10 P T 5 P L 0.5 C T 1 C L 
4 10 C L 0.5 P L 1 P T 0 / L 5 C T 
5 0.5 P T 0 / T 10 C T 1 C L 5 P L 
6 5 C T 1 P L 0.5 C L 0 / T 10 P T 
7 10 P L 5 P T 0.5 C L 1 C T 0 / L 
8 1 P L 5 C L 0 / T 10 C L 0.5 P T 
9 0 / T 1 C T 10 C T 5 P L 0.5 P L 
10 1 P L 10 P L 5 C L 0.5 C T 0 / T 
4.2.7 Experiment Task 
In each experimental trial, the participants were asked to evaluate the radar surveillance 
display/navigation display and identify potential conflicts. Subsequently, the participants were to 
communicate with each other in order to resolve the conflict. The indication for the completion of one 
scenario is that an agreement is reached between the controller and the pilot to resolve a conflict. 
When a conflict cannot be resolved, the discussion would be ended at point of 5 minutes. After 5 
minutes, it would be too late to maneuver around the potential hazard and would cause a potential 
crash. 
                                                     
1
 This column presents time delay (minute). 
2
 This column presents “who is ahead” – controller (C) or pilot (P). 
3
 This column presents if this scenario is a takeoff (T) or landing (L) scenario. 
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4.2.8 Data Collection 
Questionnaire. At the end of each experimental trial, the participants completed a post-trial 
questionnaire.  The questionnaire provided four 10-point Likert scales and asked participants to rate 
their self-assessed performance, communication effectiveness, frustration level and trial difficulty. 
Table 4-3 shows the form that the performance question took. For the complete content of the 
questionnaires, please refer to Appendix A and B. Other scales, like NASA Task Load Index (TLX), 
were not selected because their measurements are not the most effective ones for the purpose of this 
experiment. 
Table 4-3: Example of the Likert Scale in the post-trial questionnaire (performance) 
# Title Descriptions Rating 
1 PERFORMANCE 
How successful do you think 
you were in accomplishing the 
goals of the task set by the 
researcher? How satisfied were 
you with your performance in 
accomplishing these goals? 
PERFORMANCE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Poor       Good 
 
 
Result sheet. Besides the questionnaire, the participants were also asked to write down their 
negotiation results on a result sheet by the end of each official trial. Usually, the pilot in the group 
would finish the sheet. The time taken to complete the sheet was not calculated into the 
communication time. 
Audio recording. The experimental trials were audio recorded for the purpose of analyzing 
communication time and clarification information. In the analysis stage, these recordings were 
transcribed. The transcriptions were used to develop objective measures of communication time and 
counts of the number of clarification communication events.  
4.3 Results 
Across all participants, 60 trials were performed, among which 24 were “pilot ahead”, 24 were 
“controller ahead” and 12 were zero delay. The matrix in Table 4-4 presents the specific number of 
the performed scenarios in relation to “who is ahead.” Experimental packages 1 and 2 were 
experienced by 2 pairs each, while packages 3 to 10 were experience once each.  
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Table 4-4: Number of Scenarios Performed in relation to “Who is Ahead” 
 
Delay Interval (min) Total Number of 
Scenarios 
Performed 0 0.5 1 5 10 
Pilot ahead / 6 6 6 6 24 
Controller 
ahead 
/ 6 6 6 6 24 
No delay 12 / / / / 12 
Total 12 12 12 12 12 60 
 
4.3.1 Objective Data 
Communication time. Communication time refers to the time from the beginning of the trial until 
the participants reached an agreement on a resolution action. Table 4-5 presents the average 
communication time and standard error for each delay interval. Figure 4-3 (a) provides a visual 
presentation of the data. Error bars in the figure represent the standard error. The general trend 
indicates that the communication time increases when someone has more updated information (either 
the pilot or the controller).  
Table 4-5: Communication Time for Each Delay Interval (minute) 
 
Delay Interval (minute) 
0 0.5 1 5 10 
Mean 
(minute) 
192.333 147.167 182.917 163.417 216.250 
Standard 
Error 
28.498 16.382 30.223 17.779 28.604 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there were statistically 
significant differences in communication time over the five different delay times. There were no 
outliers and the data was normally distributed for each group, as assessed by boxplot and Shapiro-
Wilk test (p > .05), respectively. The assumption of sphericity was not violated, as assessed by 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity, 2 (9) = 7.605, p > .05. The delay time did not elicit statistically 
significant changes in communication time, F (4, 44) = 2.344, p = .069. 
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Number of clarification statements. Based on the review of the transcripts, a clarification was 
defined as the moment that 1) one party of the pair asks the other party to either confirm and/or 
describe one or more particular object(s), and/or 2) one party of the pair disagrees with the other on 
the description/position/information of one/more particular object(s). Therefore, if one party merely 
does not hear the description clearly and asks for more explanation, it was not counted as a 
clarification. Table 4-6 presents the average number of clarification statements and standard error for 
each delay interval. Figure 4-3 (b) plots the relationship between the average number of clarification 
statements and the delay intervals. The overall trend indicates that an increase of the time delay 
increases the number of the clarification statements.  
Table 4-6: Number of Clarification Statements for Each Delay Interval 
 
 
Due to the fact that there were extreme outliers in the data and it was not normally distributed, a 
non-parametric method - Friedman test - was run to determine if the observed differences in the 
number of clarification statements was statistically significant. The results showed that there was a 
statistically significant difference in the number of clarification statements depending on the delay 
intervals, 2 (4) = 19.200, p = .001. A post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank test was 
conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significant level set at p < .005. The 
only significant difference found was between delay 0.5-minute and 10-minute in number of 
clarification statements (Z = -2.953, p = .003).  
 
Delay Interval (minute) 
0 0.5 1 5 10 
Mean 1.583 0.833 1.750 1.583 3.167 
Standard 
error 
0.468 0.241 0.411 0.468 0.405 
Median 1 1 1.5 1 3 





Figure 4-3. Mean Value Plots of Objective Measurements 
As shown in Figure 4-3, there is a drop of communication time and number of clarification 
statements at the time delay of 30 seconds. A review of the scenarios generated for a time delay of 30 
seconds indicated that this could be caused by an artificial design flaw in the scenarios. The potential 
conflicts presented in the 30-second delay scenarios (S2_T and S2_L in Table 4-1) were less pressing 
compared with other scenarios. Participants tend to find this scenario easier in finding the right 
resolution for it. 
4.3.2 Subjective Data 
The main resource of subjective data is the self-rate measurements collected from the post-trial 
questionnaires. The four measurements were performance, communication effectiveness, frustration, 
and trial level of difficulty. Checks were made for learning effects and the data showed ratings were 
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Figure 4-4. Learning Effect 
Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 show the distributions of observed ratings for the four measurements for 
controller and pilot participants respectively. The higher the score is, the better the performance and 
communication effectiveness is. The lower the score is, the less frustration and trial difficulty is 
experienced. Visual inspections indicate an observable shift of more participants to giving lower 
scores for performance and communication effectiveness as the time delay increases. The figures also 
show a shift of more participants to giving higher scores for frustrated and find the trial more difficult 
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In order to better understand the relationship between the rating scores and the time delay, 
Friedman test was used to test if time delay has a statistically significant effect on these four 
subjective measurements. The reason for choosing the Friedman test is because the self-assessed 
scores are ordinal rather than interval. The test was conducted on controller and pilot participants’ 
results respectively. The results are shown in Table 4-7. 




Performance   ( )                  ( )                
Communication Effectiveness   ( )                  ( )                
Frustration Level   ( )                  ( )                
Level of Difficulty   ( )                 ( )                
 
As demonstrated in the table, the delay only has a statistically significant effect on controller 
participants’ performance. A post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted with a 
Bonferroni correction applied. However, none of the follow-up comparisons were significant. This 
was due to the limitations of the sample size. 
4.4 Discussion & Implications 
There are several key implications from the results presented above. Delay time had an observable 
but not statistically significant effect on the participants’ communication, performance, frustration 
level and perceived trial difficulty level. Long delays on the order of 10 minutes produced increased 
frustration and need for clarifications, and longer conflict resolution times. While 10 minutes is an 
unrealistic delay time for distributing object locations, it is on the same order of the time delays that 
are experienced when communicating about weather in current operations.  
It was obvious that there is a consistency between the subjective data and objective data. 
Regardless of who has the most updated information, an increase of time delay would increase the 
time for communication and number of clarification statements, as well as leading to more frustration 
and less effective communication. There is also a consistency between controller and pilot 
participants’ results (Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6). 
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Although there were observable trends of the time delay effect on subjective measurements, no 
meaningful statistical significance was found. This result is different from the original hypothesis, 
which was that there was a causal relationship between time delay and operators’ performance, 
communication effectiveness, frustration level and perceived trial difficulty level. However, the result 
is insightful in regard of systems design - the delay should be avoided as much as possible to better 
facilitate every operator’s communication and task performance. 
During the study, it was observed that the characters of the participants could also affect the final 
resolution of the conflict. In a pair where one participant takes more initiatives and is more vocal in 
expressing his/her opinions than the other one, this participant tends to be the dominant leader in the 
conversation. It would lead to the result that the resolution would be largely based on the dominant 
participant’s recommendations. 
There are several limitations to the study that restrict the implications that can be drawn, 
particularly for shorter delay times; however, these limitations can be addressed in future studies.  
Effects of differential time delays at the shorter durations were not as pronounced due to the artificial 
flaw in the scenario design, where the potential conflicts in Delay 0.5 scenarios were not as pressing 
as other scenarios. It is also thought that the use of static pictures eliminated important time pressure 
factors and did not present participants with a dynamic vision of the situation. The lack of motion 
could have affected the participants’ ability to make precise predictions and decisions and masked 
differences in the effects of shorter delay times.  
4.5 Future Work 
Future work could consider using different update rates for different objects in the airspace. In this 
study, asynchronous information on UAS, birds, and weather were all updated at the same rate. In 
operations, however, the dynamics of these objects are not exactly the same and there may be 
advantages to having different update rates. For slow-moving objects, such as weather and broad 
areas of bird activity, rapid updates may be perceived as unnecessary as reducing update rate is one 
method of reducing costs and bandwidth requirements.  
Future research will as well narrow the delay window to a smaller range that is more likely to 
represent the time delays that would be observed for transmitting object position data.  The study will 
be repeated in a part-task dynamic simulation environment and it is hoped that professional 
controllers and pilots can be recruited.  
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 4 presents an initial experiment as a first attempt to understand the possible effect of 
asynchronous information on communication, where naïve participants were shown static pictures of 
a radar surveillance display/navigation display. Both subjective and objective measurements were 
collected and analyzed. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not fully verified. While, descriptively, an increase 
in time delay caused more time to be spent on communication, no statistically significant difference 
was found. However, there was a significant difference in the number of clarification statements 
depending on the delay intervals, which was found between Delay 0.5 and 10 minutes. The 
descriptive analysis of subjective measures suggested that as the time delay increases, the participants 
feel more frustrated and find the trial more difficult. Visual inspection also suggests that an increase 
in time delay would result in worse performance and communication effectiveness. However, it was 
found that such an effect was not statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not fully 
verified. Limitations of the study have been also identified, and there is future research need to recruit 
subject matter experts for a more dynamic and advanced study.   
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Chapter 5 
Survey on Information Level of Detail 
One of the challenges identified in Chapter 3 – displayed information level of detail – is closely 
related with operators’ decision-making while encountering non-cooperative objects. There are 3 
aspects of the challenge that were selected for in depth investigation:  
1) what level of detailed information do the operators need? (i.e. do the operators need to know 
the information about every single bird in a flock?); 
2) the limits of current technologies in presenting the information; and  
3) the range of operators’ desired information (i.e. what are the categories of information that 
operators need?).  
Among the different types of non-cooperative objects, UAS, as discussed in Chapter 2, is a 
relatively new class of aircraft and is especially in need of more research in order to provide 
operational guidelines (FAA, 2013). Therefore, the research question was to understand, from pilots 
and controllers’ point of view, what information about UAS they require, and how this information 
should be displayed to effectively support operators’ task performance. In order to explore the 
research question, an online survey study was designed for pilots and air traffic controllers. 
The remainder of the chapter discusses the overall survey structure and objectives, survey 
implementation and analysis results.  
5.1 Goal 
The primary goal of the survey was to develop a better understanding of what information pilots and 
controllers currently have access to about UAS operation in controlled airspace, and what information 
they will need to have access to should additional UAS (both cooperative and non-cooperative) be 
introduced into the system. A wide range of types of UAS vehicles were of interest, including the 
potential of multiple UAS operating within controlled airspace as a group (swarm/formation of UAS). 
In addition, the survey has the secondary goals of testing potential means of displaying 
swarms/formations to pilots (on navigational displays) and controllers (on radar displays), and 
understanding better controller and pilot tolerances for time-delays when having access to common 
surveillance data. 
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5.2 Survey Design 
5.2.1 Survey Design process 
The development of the survey occurred in five stages. The first stage was identifying human factors 
challenges by reviewing a model of the future operational environment (Yuan, Histon, Waslander, 
Dizaji, & Schneider, 2012). The second stage comprised development of specific areas of interest in 
consultation with subject matter experts. Discussions were held with air traffic control and flight 
professionals from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in order to generate and 
validate open research issues and develop an initial set of survey questions.  
These issues and potential questions were revised with the help and guidance of industrial partners 
and other academics (the third stage). Multiple iterations in this stage played a key role in refining the 
areas of most interest and applicability, and identified additional areas of interest broadening the 
scope of the survey.  
The output of the previous three stages was a complete draft of the survey. In a fourth stage, the 
draft was shared with a few additional air traffic controllers and pilots who were not engaged in 
previous stages. They provided feedback on appropriateness of domain-specific wording and 
graphics, understandability of the instructions, and provided better estimates of the time-to-complete.  
The fifth and final stage was distribution and data collection. The survey was developed using 
SurveyGizmo, an online tool. It was estimated to take 45 minutes to complete. The full sets of 
surveys are illustrated in Appendix C and D. The survey was distributed to both air traffic controllers 
(enroute / terminal and tower) and pilots (commercial / general aviation/ student) with wording and 
images adjusted to be appropriate for the different participant groups (pilot and controller). Section 
5.3 discusses the recruitment of the participants and survey distribution in detail.  
5.2.2 Final Survey 
This section provides the details of the survey design, including the objectives of each survey section 
and how each question was designed to accomplish the objectives. Notation is used to cross reference 




 means it is Question 10 in 
controller survey and Question 9 in pilot survey; 52
C/P 
refers to Question 52 in both controller and 
pilot survey. 
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Overall, the survey is organized into six sections:  
1. Operators’ Previous Experience with UAS; 
2. Information Availability and Display Needs for Individual UAS or Formation of UAS with the 
Same Dynamic; 
3. Information Needs for Formation of UAS with Various Dynamics;  
4. Presentation of Formation/Swarms of UAS,  
5. Communication Ambiguity   
6. Information Intermittency.  
Section 5.2.2.1 to Section 5.2.2.6 discuss the survey design and objectives in detail.  
5.2.2.1 Section 1: Operators’ Experience with UAS 
The objective of Section 1 was to gather data on controller and pilot experiences with UAS, either 
operating singly or in a formation, and to identify controller and pilot perceptions of the limits, 
challenges and needed improvements for existing surveillance sources. In order to meet these 









 aimed to understand the current challenges of primary radar 
(controllers) / surveillance systems (pilots) and identify most desired improvements in the next 
generation primary radar system / next generation collision avoidance display. Question 10
C/P
 was a 
branch point to separate participants with UAS experience from the ones without. Participants were 
asked to indicate their experiences with the four possible categories of UAS (combination of 
cooperative / non-cooperative and operating singly / in formation). For participants who indicated 
they have had UAS experience in Question 10
C/P
, a follow on question - Question 11
C/P
 - asked where 
in their airspace the UAS were operating / where in their flight experience they have seen UAS 
operating. 
5.2.2.2 Section 2: Information Needs and Availability for Individual UAS or Formation of UAS 
With the Same Dynamic  
Having the information from Section 1 of UAS encountering experiences, the objectives of Section 2 
were to 1) identify the operators’ information needs and availability for handling individually 
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operated UAS or formation of UAS, and 2) identify potential challenges in interpreting the UAS 
information. Formation flight is defined as “more than one aircraft operating as a single aircraft with 
regard to navigation and position reporting” (ICAO, 2005). Formations are sometimes also referred to 
as swarms in the literature. In this section, formation of UAS is considered having similar dynamics 
as an individual UAS where the individual UAS in the formation would move around in synchrony. 
As described in the previous section, the participants were divided into two groups after 10
C/P
 – 
operators with experiences related to UAS and operators without experiences of encountering UAS. 
These two groups were assigned different paths in Section 2. Figure 5-1 shows the logic design of 
Section 2.  
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Figure 5-1. Question Logic of Section 2 
For operators who have had experience handling UAS, Question 12
C/P
 asked the participants what 
category of UAS was involved in their most recent encounter, which was used to set the context for 
the following questions. The objective of Questions 13
C/P
 – 15C/P and Questions 17C/P – 18C/P was to 
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understand what information about the individual / formation of UAS states and capabilities they had 
during that encounter and if that information was sufficient for performing the control task. Question 
16
C/P
 asked the participants if they have any challenges in obtaining, using and interpreting UAS 
information. If the answer were affirmative, the participants would be shown Question 19
C/P
, asking 
for up to the 3 most important challenges.  
For operators who had never encountered situations involving UAS at all, they were presented with 





) in an imaginary situation and asked to foresee 3 main challenges in obtaining, using and 
interpreting the UAS information (Question 24
C/P
).  
5.2.2.3 Section 3: Information Needs for Formation of UAS with Various Dynamics 
In certain situations, the individual aircraft in a formation may be moving quite randomly within the 
confines of an overall average group motion. Although there is a growing demand of UAS formation 
application, there is not much research of this operation form, and it is yet unclear what information 
about the formation is essential for pilots and controllers operating in the same airspace. Therefore, 
the objective of Section 3 was to assess if and how information needs are different if UAS are 
operating in a formation or swarm while its individual UAS have different dynamics. 
In order to meet the objective, Questions 25
C/P
 – 27C/P first aimed to understand operators’ 
information needs for each and every individual UAS in a formation as well as for a lead UAS, which 
is the leader of a formation. For certain information, such as altitude and ground/air speed, it could 
vary across different individual UAS in a formation. As a result, Question 28
C/P
 asked the participants 
to identify their requirements of information that could be influenced by the dynamics of the 
formation. Lastly, Questions 29
C/P
 – 30C/P asked the operators to consider the formation as whole and 
aimed to identify their requirements of information that is independent of individual UAS dynamics. 
5.2.2.4 Section 4: Presentation of Formation/Swarms of UAS 
The objectives of Section 4 were to 1) gather feedback on four different methods of presenting 
swarms of UAS with the goal of further understanding what information is required for decision 
making, and 2) to examine whether the complexity of a traffic situation or other factors influence 
preferences amongst the presentation types and information needs. 
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In order to meet the first objective, participants were first presented with the four presentations in 
close-up images, low and high traffic density situations respectively. The generation of the 
presentations was based on consulting certified air traffic controllers and pilots at ICAO. 
The four types of presentations are described as below, and for each presentation, there were 4 
questions:  
1) A present position symbol and data-block is shown for each individual UAS in the swarm, and a 
single data-block is shown for the swarm as a whole (Questions 31
C/P
 – 34C/P); 
2) A present position symbol for the position of a single “lead” UAS, and one data-block shown for 
the swarm as a whole (Questions 35
C/P
 – 38C/P);  
3) A present position symbol is shown for each individual UAS in the swarm, and a single data 
block is shown for the swarm as a whole (Questions 39
C/P
 – 42C/P);  
4) An outline circling all of the individual UAS in the swarm, and a single data-block shown for the 
swarm as a whole (Questions 43
C/P









 evaluated the effectiveness of the presentation in providing 







 asked the participants to provide up to 3 key words / short phrases to describe their 








 then aimed to identify any missing 








 tried to understand 
how effective the presentations are in handling formation breakdown situation. 
For the second objective, participants were asked to rank the presentation types in order of 
preference in both low (47
C/P
) and high (49
C
) traffic density situations respectively. Pilot participants 
were not asked to rank high traffic density situation, because pilots normally would zoom in / out on 
their display to adjust how many planes are shown when the environment gets busy. Both pilot and 





). Controllers were asked to comment on any difference in their rankings based on the low and 
high traffic density situations (51
C
).  
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5.2.2.5 Section 5: Communication Ambiguity 
The objective of Section 5 was to follow-up on Yuan et al. (2012)’s work to understand better 
controller and pilot tolerances to asynchronous surveillance information. Asynchronous information 
was discussed in Chapter 4. It refers to the possibility of two operators both having access to a 
common data source, but with a time delay meaning the information available at a given moment in 
time is not the same for both operators.  The asynchrony would potentially increase the cognitive 
complexity and difficulty in pilot-controller communication (Yuan et al., 2012). Section 5 of the 
survey aimed to identify if there are potential challenges and advantages in sharing non-cooperative 
object information between controller and pilot, and to identify how information asynchrony affects 
the communication. 
In order to achieve the objectives, participants were first asked to list up to three bullet points 








) if surveillance information about non-
cooperative objects (i.e. birds) was shared directly with pilots/controllers.  
The operators were then asked to consider a scenario of a final approach where the pilots’ and 
controllers’ displays of non-cooperative objects are not exactly the same. Controllers’ display might 




 asked the 
operators 1) what an maximum acceptable time delay between the two’s display can be, 2) if the 
answer in 1) depends on whose display is more updated, and 3) what the maximum difference in 
distance (in nautical miles) between the actual position of the non-cooperative objects and the 
position of the non-cooperative objects shown on their display. The answers help to visualize what an 
acceptable delay and a maximum difference in distance could be. 
5.2.2.6 Section 6: Information Intermittency 
Information intermittency is one of the human factors challenges identified in Chapter 3. The 
objective of Section 6 was to determine the frequency with which intermittency occurs in current 
operations, understand the limitations and challenges of current techniques in dealing with 
information intermittency, and identify any difference in how information intermittency for a UAS 
affect the operators as opposed to traditional piloted aircraft. 








 asked the participants how often 
they have observed the “intermittency effect” on an aircraft, and if they have ever seen such an effect 
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with surveillance of UAS. If the participants indicated that they did not understand what intermittency 
means, they would be directly lead to the end of the survey, skipping the rest of the section.  




 quantified the amount 









 asked the participants how satisfied they are with current technologies in handling the 









 aimed to identify if there is a difference between handling 
intermittent UAS information and intermittent traditional manned aircraft information. These two 
questions are essentially the same but with slightly different wording for participants with and 
without experience observing intermittent UAS. 
5.3 Survey Implementation 
5.3.1 Participant Recruitment 
The survey was distributed through personal contacts, bulletin boards, and existing academic and 
industrial relationships. It was also published on several websites and ATC/pilot forums. The forums 
and websites include LiveATC.net, stuckmic.com, pprune.org, theairlinewebsite.com, AVCanada.ca, 
ATCmonitor.com, airlinepilotforums.com and LinkedIn professional groups. Participation in the 
study was voluntary. 
5.3.2 Data Collection 
Survey data was collected between March 22
nd
, 2013 and July 7
th
, 2013, during which 116 and 111 
responses were collected from professional air traffic controllers and pilots respectively (Table 5-1). 
For the purpose of the thesis, only complete responses were used for analyses. Verification of the 
responses was performed by checking the recorded answers of each completed response for 
consistency. It was ensured that there were no excessive blanks in the responses and inconsistent 
answers. Inconsistency appears when participants’ answers 1) in different parts of the survey 
contradict with each other, and / or 2) do not demonstrate their experience level as indicated at the 
beginning of the survey.  
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Table 5-1: Collected Survey Responses 
Responses Status Air Traffic Controllers Pilots 
Complete 51 51 
Partial 64 59 
Disqualified 1 1 
Total 116 111 
 
Due to the length of the complete survey, a branch point was included in the survey after Section 2. 
All of the participants would go through Section 2, and then they were randomly assigned to either 
Pathway A or B. Pathway A consists of Section 4 and 5, and Pathway B includes Section 3 and 6. 
The number of participants who completed the survey in each path is displayed in Table 5-2.  
Table 5-2: Number of Participants in Each Path 
 Controller Pilot 
Pathway A B A B 
# of Complete 
Responses 
26 25 28 23 
5.3.3 Demographic Information 
As shown in Figure 5-2, over 30% of the 51 controller participants are over 50 years old. The 
majority of the participants were from North America and Europe. Around 50% of the participants 
have 21 or more years of professional experience as certified air traffic controllers. The top three most 
recent capacities of the participants’ are Enroute specialty (35%), Terminal specialty (39%) and 
Tower specialty (27%). 
Figure 5-3 presents the pilot participants’ demographic information. Over 30% of the 51 pilot 
participants are between 30 to 39 years old. The majority of the participants were from North 
America and Europe. Over 50% of the participants hold air transport pilot certification. On average, 
































































































Years of Experience 







Percentage of Participants 
Most Recent Facility Type 






















































































































 Hightest Pilot Certification 
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5.4 Results 
The survey covers a wide range of research questions. However, in the particular interest of the thesis, 
the following sections present the analyses of results of both pilots and air traffic controllers 
respectively and their experience with UAS (Survey Section 1), information availability and display 
needs for individual UAS or formation of UAS with the same dynamic (Survey Section 2), and 
communication with information asynchrony (Survey Section 5). The purposes of these three sections 
were previously discussed in Section 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.6 of the thesis 
5.4.1 Limitations and Improvements of Primary Radar / Surveillance Systems 
In the first section of the survey, participants were asked to list up to 3 limitations of the current 
primary radar and 3 improvements they would like to see in the next generation radar surveillance 
systems.  
5.4.1.1 Air Traffic Controllers 
Based on the collected 125 comments of primary radar limitations, some common themes were 
extracted. For example, “low level coverage” and “altitude, aircraft below coverage” both indicated a 
limitation of the primary radar coverage. The common theme is then deemed as radar coverage. 
Table 5-3 illustrates the top 5 themes of primary radar limitations that are most frequently mentioned. 
It also lists examples of representative comments in each theme. The other category is comprised of 
18 types of limitations that made up the 14% of the total comments.  
The difference between radar coverage and lack of information is that lack of information refers to 
the situation where a target is detected, but no sufficient information is provided, whereas radar 
coverage simply indicates a target is not detected at all. 
Similarly, 103 comments were collected for desired potential improvements to primary radar. 
Table 5-4 shows the top 5 features that needed to be improved along with example comments from 
the participants. The other category consists of 15 different types of improvements and represented 
36% of the comments.  
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 “false radar targets” 
 “erroneous targets” 
 “differentiating between ground 
clutter and low level airborne 




 “low level coverage” 





 “background clutter” 
 “If scope is busy with flight data, 




 “doesn’t show heading” 
 “smaller aircraft not always 
visible” 




 “weather capabilities” 
 “weather detection” 
 “no weather display” 
Other (18) 14% 
 “data input capabilities” 
 “replacement part availability” 
 “increased separation when on 
maintenance” 
 











 “make digitized (data) more 
accurate” 
 “better filtering” 




 “better coverage” 
 “increased range at all altitudes” 




 “altitude reporting” 
 “ability to see intent of airborne 
aircraft” 







 “integration of radar and ADS-
B” 
 “satellite integrated with ground 
based radar” 
 “multi-radar source” 
Declutter 5% 
 “reduction of clutter” 
 “removal of wind farm returns” 
Other (15) 36% 
 “mode s improvement” 
 “less radar delay” 




Similarly as controllers’ analysis, common themes were extracted based on the 145 comments of 
limitations collected. Table 5-5 illustrates the top 5 themes of current surveillance systems limitations 
that are most frequently mentioned. It also demonstrates examples comments in each theme. In 
alerting system, NOTAM stands for a Notice to Airmen, which is a notice filed by aviation authority 
alerting pilots of potential hazards. Other category consists of 15 types of limitations that made up the 
21% of the total comments.  








 “very limited radar and electronic identification” 
 “radar contact (low RCS)” 
 “ground radar usually limited to secondary 
surveillance radar” 
Visual acquisition of 
targets 
19% 
 “visual spotting” 




 “subject to the controller having the time to notify 
you of it” 
 “communication” 
 “must be on the same frequency on the radio “ 
Lack of information 12% 
 “lack of ATC awareness” 
 “traffic calls from ATC are based on track, not 
heading” 
 “My aircraft not equipped with TCAS” 
Alerting system 9% 
 “Info often buried in a slew of Notams and 
potentially missed” 
 “Buried deep in NOTAMS” 
 “NOTAM” 
Other (14) 21% 
 “Real time information” 
 “Planning Methods” 
 “Pilots not following procedures or using radio” 
  
121 comments were collected for the potential improvements to be included in a next generation 
collision avoidance display. Table 5-6 demonstrates the top 5 features that needed to be improved 
along with example comments from the participants, with enhanced technologies and detection 
capabilities most needed. The other category consists of 13 different types of improvements making 
up 27% of the comments.  
   60 




Original Comments from Participants 
Enhanced technologies and 
detection capabilities 
23% 
 “power line detection” 
 “radar XSection enhancer” 
 “stationary/slow moving objects identification” 
Improve alerting system 22% 
 “ability to be warned” 
 “better notice to pilots when UAS in use”, 





 “change in symbols that would define either 
manned or unmanned” 
 “a next generation collision avoidance display 
should be a heads up display (HUD)” 
Improve accuracy 9% 
 “accuracy of position in display” 
 “accuracy” 
 “multi-target (>3) resolution capability” 
Provide more information 9% 
 “TCAS” 
 “along with existing TCAS information: target 
identification data, (type of object, speed, 
altitude, track, vertical speed)” 
Other (13) 27% 
 “more radar coverage” 
 “continue to advance training to keep pace with 
avionics development” 
 “reliable” 
5.4.2 Operators’ Experience with UAS 
In order to accurately map participants’ background in relation to UAS, the second section of the 
survey asked the participants to indicate if they have previous working / encountering experience with 
UAS (Question 10
C/P
), and, if they do, what type of UAS experience it was (Question 11
C/P
). 
5.4.2.1 Air Traffic Controllers 
If participants indicated they have never encountered any situation involving any of the 4 categories 
of UAS (cooperative individual UAS, cooperative formation of UAS, non-cooperative individual 
UAS and non-cooperative formation of UAS),, they were considered as inexperienced with UAS. As 
discussed in Section 5.2.2.1 (Survey Section 1), participants without UAS experience would be 
directed into non-experience stream, skip Question 11
C
 and answer Questions 20
C
 – 24C. The 
definition of “experienced” air traffic controllers are the ones who: 
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1) have had UAS present in their airspace but it had no effect on operations; 
2) have had UAS present in the airspace and it affected the control decisions but no separation 
services were provided to the UAS; and/or 
3) have had UAS present in the airspace and separation services were provided between an 
aircraft under their control and the UAS. 
Based on the literature review, it was expected that the majority of the participants would not have 
experiences related to UAS. Quite surprisingly, Figure 5-4 shows that close to 60% of the controller 
participants have previous experiences with UAS. The data is from a random sample of 51 
participants, and observations in the sample are independent of each other. The error bars represent an 
exact confidence interval of 95% for binomial data. The confidence interval is calculated based on 
Pezzullo’s (2009) exact binomial confidence intervals calculator.  
 
Figure 5-4. Air Traffic Controllers’ Experience with UAS4 
                                                     
4
 The percentages in the graph represent the percentages of participants who answered this 
question. As described in Section 5.3.2 of the thesis, because of the different pathways through the 


























Air Traffic Controllers' Experience with UAS (51) 
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Subsequently, the participants’ specific UAS encounter experience was analyzed (Figure 5-5). The 
percentage is calculated based on the responses from 29 participants with UAS experience. As shown 
in the figure, participants have notably more experiences with individual UAS rather than formation 
of UAS. The most frequently occurring situation is air traffic controllers providing separation services 
for individual UAS (69%).  
 
Figure 5-5. Controllers’ Encounter Experience with Individual UAS vs. Formation of UAS 
Given the specific interest of the thesis in individually operated UAS, an analysis of encounter 
experience regarding individual cooperative versus non-cooperative UAS was performed. As 
demonstrated in Figure 5-6, more participants have experienced encountering individual cooperative 
UAS than non-cooperative ones in general. In particular, around 38% and 14% of the 29 participants 
with UAS experience indicated that the presence of cooperative and non-cooperative UAS did not 
affect their routine operations. Most often, however, approximately 62% and 24% of the 29 
participants with UAS experience provided separation service to individual cooperative UAS and 
non-cooperative UAS respectively. The number of participants who provided separation service to 
non-cooperative UAS seems unusual. However, after reviewing the responses of those participants 
who indicated they had provided separation services, the value presented does reflect the experiences 

















































Controller's Expereince with Individual UAS vs Formation of 
UAS (29) 
Individual UAS Formation of UAS
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that the controllers are considering the provision of separation services to the manned aircraft that are 
involved in the encounter instead of the non-cooperative UAS. 
 
Figure 5-6. Controllers’ Encounter Experience of Individual Coop vs. Non-coop UAS5 
Participants were also asked to indicate the location where they have observed UAS operating in 
their airspace. Figure 5-7 suggested that, for the 29 participants who have had UAS encounter 
experience, 62% of them have seen individual cooperative UAS operating in low traffic density 
regions, and 28% have seen individual non-cooperative UAS operating in designated UAS operation 
airspace. It should also be noted that around 55% and 22% of the 29 participants with UAS 
experience have experienced situations where individual cooperative and non-cooperative UAS were 
in close proximity to the standard flows of aircraft. 
                                                     
5
 The total number of participants who have had experience with one category of UAS in certain 
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Controllers' Experience of Individual Coop vs Non-coop UAS 
(29) 
Individual Cooperative UAS (transponder equipped)
Individual Non-cooperative UAS (no transponder equipped)
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Figure 5-7. Locations where Controllers Have Observed Individual UAS Operations 
A comparison of frequency of UAS operation locations is shown in Table 5-7. The most frequently 
operated location of individual UAS operation is different for cooperative and non-cooperative UAS. 
Cooperative UAS tend to be operated in low traffic density regions, whereas non-cooperative UAS 
are mainly operated in designated airspace.  
Table 5-7: Frequency of Location of Individual UAS Operations (Controller) 
Frequency of Location 
of Operations 
Category of UAS 
Individual cooperative UAS Individual non-cooperative UAS 
Highest In low traffic density regions of 
the airspace 
In airspace designated for UAS 
operations 
 In close proximity to the 
standard flows of aircraft 
through the airspace 
In close proximity to the standard 
flows of aircraft through the 
airspace 
In airspace designated for UAS 
operations 
In other higher traffic density 
regions of the airspace 
Lowest 
In other higher traffic density 
regions of the airspace 







In close proximity to
the standard flows of
aircraft through the
airspace
In other high traffic
density regions of
the airspace
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Operations (29) 
Individual Cooperative UAS (transponder equipped)
Individual Non-cooperative UAS (no transponder equipped)
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5.4.2.2 Pilots 
In addition to the results of the controller experiences with UAS presented above, pilot experiences 
with UAS were also collected and analyzed. The definition of “experienced” pilots is the ones who: 
1) have discussed with other pilots about their experience maneuvering around UAS; 
2) have been aware of the presence of UAS presence at a close range to me; 
3) had to alter course of their aircraft while taking into consideration the presence of UAS; and/or 
4) have collided with UAS. 
If pilot participants indicated they have never encountered any situation involving any of the 4 
categories of UAS (cooperative individual UAS, cooperative formation of UAS, non-cooperative 
individual UAS and non-cooperative formation of UAS), they were considered as inexperienced with 
UAS. Slightly different from controller participants’ result, as illustrated in Figure 5-8, there are 
fewer pilots who have encountered UAS (42%) than the ones who have not (58%). The data is from a 
random sample of 48 participants, and observations in the sample are independent of each other. The 
error bars represent an exact confidence interval of 95% for binomial data.  
 
Figure 5-8. Pilots’ Experience with UAS6 
                                                     
6
 The percentages in the graph represent the percentages of participants who answered this 
question. As described in Section 5.3.2 of the thesis, because of the different pathways through the 


























Pilots' Experience with UAS (48) 
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As shown in Figure 5-9, participants have notably more experiences with individual UAS rather 
than formation of UAS except in the collision situation. While UAS collision incidents / accidents are 
relatively rare, about 30% of the 20 participants with UAS experience have been directly affected by 
the presence of individual UAS as well as discussed with other pilots about their maneuver 
experience around UAS. 
 
Figure 5-9. Pilot Experience with Individual UAS vs. Formation of UAS 
Given the specific interest of the thesis in individually operated UAS, an analysis of encounter 
experience regarding individual cooperative versus non-cooperative UAS was performed. As 
demonstrated in Figure 5-10, the rate of encounters with individual UAS is the same for cooperative 
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Figure 5-10. Pilot Experience of Individual Coop vs. Non-coop UAS 
Participants were also asked to indicate the location where they have observed UAS operating. 
Figure 5-11 suggested that the main UAS operation area is not their designated airspace. Only about 
35% and 25% of the 20 participants with UAS experience, who have had UAS experience, have seen 
individual cooperative and non-cooperative UAS operating in designated UAS operation area.  
Participants also have seen individual cooperative UAS in more places than individual non-
cooperative UAS. Fifty-five percent of the 20 participants with UAS experience have seen individual 
cooperative UAS operating in a close range to manned aircraft, and 45% have seen individual non-
cooperative UAS operate in a close range to manned aircraft as well as in designated UAS operation 
airspace. No individual non-cooperative UAS has been seen operating in the visual flight rules (VFR) 
airfield traffic pattern or on approach in controlled airspace. 
A comparison of the frequency of individual UAS operation location is shown in Table 5-8. Quite 
surprisingly, the possible location of individual UAS presence is the same for individual cooperative 






















































Pilot Experience of Individual Coop vs Non-coop UAS (20) 
Individual Cooperative UAS (transponder equipped)
Individual Non-cooperative UAS (no transponder equipped)
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Figure 5-11. Locations where Pilots Have Observed Individual UAS Operations 
Table 5-8: Frequency of Location of Individual UAS Operation (Pilot) 
Frequency of Location 
of Operation 
Category of UAS 
Individual cooperative UAS Individual non-cooperative UAS 
Highest 
In close proximity to pilot’s 
aircraft 
In close proximity to pilot’s 
aircraft 
 
On pilot’s pre-scheduled flight 
path 
On pilot’s pre-scheduled flight 
path 
In airspace designated for UAS 
operations 










In the VFR 
airfield traffic 
patter 


























































Locations where Pilots Have Observed Individual UAS Operations 
(20) 
Individual Cooperative UAS (transponder equipped)
Individual Non-cooperative UAS (no transponder equipped)
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5.4.3 Information Needs & Information Availability for UAS 
Certain information is critical for pilots and controllers to successfully perform their tasks of 
maintaining separation of aircraft and monitoring flight status. For instance, air traffic controllers 
need to know the altitudes of aircraft in their controlled airspace in order to detect potential collisions 
and develop resolution strategies. Pilots, similarly, need the information of other aircraft’s altitudes in 
order to prevent collisions. In terms of UAS operations, however, it is still unclear what the proper 
protocols should be and what information about UAS in particular is crucial to operators’ task 
performance.  
In order to understand operators’ information requirements and availabilities, the second section of 
the survey continues the investigation. Specifically, participants with previous UAS experience were 
asked to indicate what information was needed and available to them during the most recent UAS 
presence (13
C/P
 – 18C/P). Participants without UAS experience were asked to think of information that 
would be helpful in handling a potential UAS presence in their airspace (20
C/P
 – 23C/P). 
5.4.3.1 Air Traffic Controllers 
Figure 5-12 presents an overview of controllers’ information needs, which are broken down to 
“information required”, “information not required but helpful” and “information not required.” The 
percentages were calculated based on the 51 complete responses, including participants both with and 
without UAS experience. The questions in this section did not differentiate between cooperative and 
non-cooperative UAS. 
As demonstrated in Figure 5-12, current altitude of a UAS is the information identified as being 
most needed, with not a single participant stating that it should not be required. In addition, planned 
maneuvers of UAS, type of communication link, UAS current track and current ground speed are also 
listed in the top 5 most important information types. 
However, not all of the required information is available in every situation. For instance, the 
primary radar might be unable to provide the altitude of a UAS due to its small size or other false 
returns from the background.  
For the 28 controller participants who have UAS experience, Questions 13
C
 – 15C asked them 
which of the pieces of information was available in their last UAS encounter. Figure 5-13 presents 
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these information’s availabilities during operation. It can be seen that only 71% of the 28 participants 
with UAS experience indicated that the information of current altitude was immediately available. 
Additional analysis was performed to identify the relationship between information availability and 
the perceived need for that information during operations. The analysis contrasted the percentage of 
participants who said information was required with the percentage of participants who said the same 
information was available. This can give an indication of where current system design stands. 
Therefore,                       was calculated where:  
                       
                                                                     ( )
                                                                       ( ) 
This is interpreted as follows: 
When                        , the information is required but not available; 
When                        , the information is available but not required; 
When                        , the information is required and is available. 
The delta combines the results shown in Figure 5-12 and 5-13, and Figure 5-14 shows the final 
results. The limitation of this method is that it aggregates the numbers across different participants on 
required and available information, when it would be most beneficial to compare at individual 




Figure 5-12. Controller UAS Information Needs 
 
Figure 5-13. Controller UAS Information Availabilities 
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As shown in Figure 5-14, Current heading is the only type of information that equal proportions of 
controllers say is required and also available. Four types of UAS information stood out for being 
required but not available, including UAS capabilities, current altitude, type of communication link 
and planned maneuvers of UAS. 
 
Figure 5-14. Information Requirements & Availabilities (Exp. Controllers) 




 probed the desired UAS capabilities in more details. Experienced 
participants were asked to clarify what information about UAS capabilities was needed and available. 
The participants could either choose from the provided options and/or specify additional ones. The 
provided capabilities options include: turn rate, climb rate, min/max speed, weight, size, mission and 
see-and-avoid capabilities. A couple of participants also indicated that information of UAS endurance 
and the ability of not being repositioned to expedite overall traffic was not required but would have 
been helpful. As illustrated in Figure 5-15, only UAS see-and-avoid capabilities information is 
required but not available to the participants. 
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Figure 5-15. UAS Capabilities Info Requirements & Availabilities (Exp. Controllers) 
In order to better understand the difference between experienced and inexperienced controllers, the 
next analysis further compares participants’ information needs when they have UAS experience or 
not. It aims to identify the change in information requirements that is brought by gaining more 
experience with UAS. To achieve this objective, the difference                          was 
calculated where: 
                           
                                                                   ( )
                                                                       ( ) 
This is interpreted as follows: 
When                            , UAS experience increases participants’ perception of a need 
for the information; 
When                            , UAS experience decreases participants’ perception of a need 
for the information; 
When                            , information need is not affected by participants’ experience 
with UAS. 
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As can be seen in Figure 5-16, there is a greater percentage of participants with UAS experience 
who felt information about UAS model/type, current ground speed, UAS operator, UAS capabilities 
and current altitude was needed. Controllers without UAS experience were more likely than those 
with UAS experience to state that information about type of communication link, current track and 
heading was required. Interestingly enough, the number of participants requiring information of UAS 
number supervised by UAS operator, UAS planned maneuvers and current air speed is not affected 
by participants’ working experience with UAS.  
 
Figure 5-16. Change in Info Requirements Comparing Experienced and Inexperienced 
Controllers 
In terms of UAS capabilities, participants’ experience with UAS does not influence how much 
controller participants need UAS turn rate information (Figure 5-17). Yet, UAS experience does 
affect the perception of the requirements of other types of information. More participants would like 
to know about the weight and mission information of a UAS if they have had UAS experience. There 
is also a decrease in the number of participants who need size, see-and-avoid, climb rate and min/max 
speed information. 
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Figure 5-17. Change in Capability Info Requirements Comparing Experienced and 
Inexperienced Controllers 
5.4.3.2 Pilots 
Similarly as controllers’ analysis, Figure 5-18 presents an overview of pilots’ information needs, 
which were broke down to “information required”, “information not required but helpful” and 
“information not required.” The percentages were calculated based on the 46 complete responses. It 
does not differentiate between cooperative and non-cooperative UAS. 
As demonstrated in Figure 5-18, current altitude of a UAS is the information identified as being 
most needed, without a single participant stating that it was not required. In addition, planned 
maneuvers of UAS, UAS current track, type of communication link and current heading are also listed 
in the top 5 most important information types. Interestingly, only the top 3 types of information are 
required by over 50% of the participants. 
However, similar with controllers’ situation, not all of the required information is available in 
every situation. Questions 13
P
 – 15P asked the participants with UAS experience which of the pieces 
of information was available in their last UAS encounter. As shown in Figure 19, most of the time 
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Figure 5-18. Pilot UAS Information Needs 
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Therefore, the same approach used in controller’s analysis in Section 5.4.3.1is used again to 
identify the relationship between information availability and requirements:  
                       
                                                                     ( )
                                                                       ( ) 
This is interpreted as follows: 
When                        , the information is required but not available; 
When                        , the information is available but not required; 
When                        , the information is required and is available. 
The delta combines the results shown in Figure 5-18 and 5-19, and Figure 5-20 shows the final 
results. As illustrated in Figure 5-20, most information is required but not available. Current airspeed 
is the only type of information that is required and also available to the participants. It is because 
there was only one participant felt that this information was required, and another participant who 
happen to have a military background had access to it. Most of the time, the information of current 
air speed is not required and is not available to pilot participants. 
Half of the participants indicated that current altitude is needed but not available. The top 5 types 
of UAS information that are required but not available during the presence include current altitude, 
planned maneuvers of UAS, type of communication link, current track and current heading. 
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Figure 5-20. Information Requirements & Availabilities (Exp. Pilots) 





probed pilots’ UAS capability information need and availability. As illustrated in Figure 5-21, only 
UAS size information is not required but available to the participants. Other important required 
information, however, is not available. Two pilot participants also indicated that information of 
general predictability of UAS flight, UAS TCAS capability and video and recording capability was 
not required but would have been helpful. 
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Figure 5-21. UAS Capabilities Info Requirements & Availabilities (Exp. Pilots)  
The next analysis compares pilot participants’ information need while with and without UAS 
experience: 
                           
                                                                   ( )
                                                                       ( ) 
This is interpreted as follows: 
When                            , UAS experience increases participants’ perception of a need 
for the information; 
When                            , UAS experience decreases participants’ perception of a need 
for the information; 
When                            , information need is not affected by participants’ experience 
with UAS. 








UAS Capabilities  





   80 
As can be seen in Figure 5-22, a greater percentage of pilots with UAS experience felt that 
information about UAS operator was needed. The need of information about current heading is not 
affected by pilots’ UAS experience.  
 
Figure 5-22. Change in Info Requirements Comparing Experienced and Inexperienced Pilots 
In terms of UAS capabilities, overall, the information need is influenced by participants’ 
experience with UAS (Figure 5-23). The biggest decreases occur in the number of participants who 
need size, climb rate, min/max speed and see-and-avoid information. 
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Figure 5-23. Change in Capability Info Requirements Comparing Experienced and 
Inexperienced Pilots 
5.4.4 Challenges in Obtaining, Using and Interpreting UAS Information 
Closely associated with information requirements is information perception. It is not unusual that 
certain factors would inhibit operators’ ability in gathering and understanding the information. In 
order to determine such challenges about UAS information, participants (both experienced and 
inexperienced) were asked to list up to 3 challenges in obtaining, using and interpreting UAS 
information.  
5.4.4.1 Air Traffic Controllers 
In total, 53 comments of challenges were collected, and they share some common themes. For 
instance, “direct communication with UAS operating uncertainty” and “poor communication with 
operator” reflects the communication challenge. Table 5-9 illustrates the top 5 challenges in 
obtaining, using and interpreting UAS information. Representative comments from the participants 
are included. The other category consists of 8 types of challenges.  
As reflected by the comments, participants were concerned about lack of standard control 
procedures, UAS intent and UAS capabilities information. The participants also indicated challenges 
in the capability of current primary and secondary surveillance radar (PSR&SSR) technologies in 
detecting and identifying small UAS targets. In addition, “controller – UAS operator”, “controller – 
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manned aircraft pilots”, and “controller – controller” communication is also one of the major 
roadblocks for using UAS information. 




Original Comments from Participants 
Lack of information 24% 
 “lack of prescribed procedures” 
 “reason to be in my airspace” 
 “range of mission unknown” 
PSR & SSR 
capabilities 
22% 
 “Too small to be seen by primary radar” 
 “inability to see on radar” 
 “surveillance SSR info identification” 
Communication 15% 
 “Determining what to tell a controlled aircraft in 
close proximity” 
 “Inability to communicate in a NORDO situation” 
 “poor communications with operator” 
Ability of control 11% 
 “having to make other aircraft avoid UAS” 
 “mission partially in uncontrolled airspace” 
 “potential conflict with controlled aircraft” 
Clutter 7% 
 “primary return clutter“ 
 “clutter if no ability to filter by altitude” 
 “screen clutter” 
Other (8) 20% 
 “effect of wind on aircraft and wind 
speed/direction on the target” 
 “data block dissimilarities” 
 “monitoring turns on primary radar, update rate 
was slow and so turns had to be timed as a/c was 
not capable of flying headings” 
5.4.4.2 Pilots 
The top 5 challenges were identified based on the 85 comments collected (Table 5-10). 
Representative comments from the participants were included. The other category consists of 11 
types of challenges, including information accuracy, warning capabilities, operators’ situation 
awareness, security, radar coverage, etc. 
It is interesting to see that participants were concerned about both lack of information and 
information overload. It could be because the participants want the most critical and relevant UAS 
information, but do not want to be overwhelmed at the same time. 
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The participants also indicated challenges in communication with UAS operators and air traffic 
controllers when additional information is added to the system.  




Original Comments from Participants 
Lack of information 21% 
 “lateral/vertical relationship to my aircraft” 
 “managing 'Threat and Error' due lack of 
information” 
 “no information” 
Information overload 15% 
 “information overload- I still need my own data to 
fly my own aircraft, not a bunch of other data about 
other aircraft” 
 “too much information can confuse or distract” 
Detect and avoid 
capabilities 
14% 
 “Aircraft not appearing on radar or in Air Tasking 
Order” 
 “The units flight path was aerobatic and was not 
noticed visually by me” 




 “Right of way” 
 “Regulatory oversight and willingness to address 
the UAS issue” 
 “where was the UAS supposed to be operating” 
Communication 8% 
 “Congested VFR test airspace meant busy radios 
and required a dedicated radar advisory “ 
 “They are not talking to anybody” 
 “communication with controller/controlling 
agency” 
Other (11) 32% 
 “being automated instead of a real person” 
 “system accuracy” 
 “security/encryption” 
5.4.5 Communication with Shared Information & Information Asynchrony 
Communication with information asynchrony is one of the human factors challenges identified in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 expanded on the concept and presented an initial study of how controller-pilot 
communication is affect by asynchronous information. However, the participants in the study were 
naïve and did not have professional air traffic control or pilot experience. As a result, Section 5 of the 
survey was designated to present an information asynchrony scenario to the operators, and then to 
gather experienced professionals’ opinions on this matter. The first part of the section probed 
participants’ opinion on shared non-cooperative object information. The second part asked the 
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participants how asynchronous shared non-cooperative object information affects their 
communication. 
5.4.5.1 Air Traffic Controllers 
The controller participants were asked to think about a situation where non-cooperative object 
surveillance information (i.e. birds) was shared directly with pilots. The participants identified several 
advantages as well as concerns with the information sharing. As demonstrated in Table 5-11, based 
on the 33 collected comments, the participants unanimously agreed on three advantages – increased 
safety, improved situation awareness and reduced controller workload. 





Original Comments from Participants 
Increased safety 52% 
 “less chances of mid-air collision” 
 “increased safety” 




 “good situation awareness for the crew” 
 “increased vigilance” 





 “less workload on Controller” 
 “reduced communication” 
 “less information to give on frequency” 
Other 0% N/A 
 
The top 6 concerns for sharing non-cooperative object information are illustrated in Table 5-12. It 
is interesting to see that the participants consider the information sharing both as an improvement to 
(as seen in Table 11) and decrease of situation awareness. They believe that providing additional 
information to the pilots would improve the onboard crew’s awareness of the traffic and non-
cooperative objects, but would also potentially distract the operators (controllers and/or pilots) from 
their routine work. 
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Original Comments from Participants 
Inaccuracy 18% 
 “too much ghost track” 
 “inaccuracy” 




 “may be too late for a pilot to take corrective 
action” 
 “might divert attention from other targets” 
 “pulling the attention of the crew away from their 




 “increase controller workload” 
 “informing ATC of evasive maneuvers” 
 “pilots may start expecting more information than 
what we can give” 
Information overload 15% 
 “information avoidance” 
 “too much avoidance” 




 “frequency congestion“ 
 “too much radio chatter” 
 “frequency congestion with requests to avoid 
small flocks” 
Unexpected 
maneuvers by pilot 
12% 
 “unexpected avoiding maneuvers by pilots” 
 “the crew starting to self-separate without 
notifying or checking with ATC” 
 “unexpected deviations” 
Other (3) 12% 
 “every incident would become a legal nightmare 
concerning responsibilities” 
 “liability issues” 
 “better information than TCAS” 
 
In understanding how information delay affects operations, the participants were first asked what a 
maximum acceptable time delay between the two’s display can be. Fifteen participants gave a specific 
number (seconds), and the average is 20.5 seconds. Additional comments were provided indicating 
that the delay should be as short as possible.  
Secondly, when asked if their previous answer depends on whose display is more updated, 10 
participants stood by their previous answers and said would not change either way. Six participants 
said their answers would change, but depending on the situation. 
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Lastly, the participants were asked what the maximum difference in distance (in nautical miles) is 
between the actual position of the non-cooperative objects and the position of the non-cooperative 
objects shown on their display. Seventeen participants responded to the question and contributed to an 
average maximum difference of 3.87 nautical miles. 
5.4.5.2 Pilots 
Similarly, the pilot participants were asked to think about a situation where the non-cooperative 
object information (i.e. birds) is directly shared with them by the controllers. The participants 
identified several advantages as well as concerns of the information sharing. As demonstrated in 
Table 5-13, based on 42 comments, the participants agreed on three advantages – increased safety, 
improved situation awareness and reduced communication. Multiple participants also indicated that 
the same technique could be applied to UAS, and therefore allow for UAS operation in the civil 
airspace. 




Original Comments from Participants 
Increased safety 76% 
 “improved safety” 
 “higher level of safety” 




 “awareness of position” 
 “allow for operation of UAS in civil airspace” 




 “reduced radio transmission” 
 “reduced vhf communications” 
Other 0% N/A 
 
On the other hand, the top 6 concerns for sharing non-cooperative object information are shown in 
Table 5-14). In total, 42 comments were collected. In describing the challenge of communication, 
participants were concerned of radio transmissions increase, language used for communication and 
the form of communication. 
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Original Comments from Participants 
Information overload 36% 
 “too much information” 
 “must tell me which contact is a threat” 
 “cluttering of screen” 
Unexpected 
maneuvers by pilot 
17% 
 “over reaction to the threat” 
 “pilots trying to avoid at low altitudes” 
 “unnecessary maneuvers” 
Distraction 14% 
 “distractions during takeoff and landing” 
 “pilot distraction” 
 “could be distracting at critical phases of flight” 
Communication 10% 
 “in Canada, language of communication” 
 “form of communication” 





 “pilot would be unable to deal with aircraft 
without electric systems“ 
 “pilot will rely on technology too much” 
Inaccuracy 5% 
 “false data” 
 “false alarms” 
Other (6) 12% 
 “low moving targets will reduce airspace flow” 
 “unreliability of the system” 
 “above a certain altitude, i.e. +150 feet AGL” 
 
In understanding how information delay affects operations, the participants were first asked what a 
maximum acceptable time delay between the two’s display can be. Twenty-one participants gave a 
specific number (seconds), and the average is 13.64 seconds.  
Secondly, when asked if their previous answer depends on whose display is more updated, 14 
participants insisted that they would not change their previous answers. Six participants said their 
answers would change, but depending on who has the more updated information. 
Lastly, the participants were asked what the maximum difference in distance (in nautical miles) is 
between the actual position of the non-cooperative objects and the position of the non-cooperative 
objects shown on their display. Twenty responses were collected and the average maximum 
difference is 2.06 nautical miles. 
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5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1 Comparison of Air Traffic Controllers and Pilots 
5.5.1.1 Limitations and Improvements of Primary Radar 
An overview of controller (Table 5-3) and pilot (Table 5-5) analysis results reveals their different 
priorities in task performance. Controllers tend to look at the airspace as a big picture and are more 
concerned about the major aspects of the picture, such as information accuracy and radar coverage. 
Pilots, on the other hand, are more sensitive to their immediate environment and personal safety. For 
instance, the limitations pilots have encountered with surveillance systems include detection 
capabilities, communication and alerting system. One common challenge shared by both parties is the 
lack of target information. This could be a result of primary radar design, in which certain 
information is omitted to reduce operators’ confusion and prevent information overload. Overall, 
there is a good correlation between the identified challenges and desired improvements for both 
parties. 
5.5.1.2 Experience with UAS 
A notable difference between controllers and pilots in terms of UAS experience is that the majority of 
controllers have had UAS experience (Figure 5-4) while most pilots do not (Figure 5-8). It was 
expected that, given the strict regulations of UAS operations in controlled airspace, both controllers 
and pilots would not have much experience working with / encountering UAS.  
The follow-up analysis reveals that controllers and pilots have experienced more situations 
involving individually operated UAS than formation of UAS (Figure 5-5, Figure 5-9). While 
controllers’ experience indicates that there are more individual cooperative UAS involved than 
individual non-cooperative UAS, pilots’ experience does not show an obvious difference.  
In the analysis of pilot participants’ UAS encounter experiences, participants who have had 
“second-hand” experience (i.e. discussed with other pilots about their experience) were counted as 
experienced. There could potentially be a discrepancy between having experience and being able to 
answer the information availability question. 
As shown in Table 5-7 (controller), individual cooperative UAS are most frequently seen in low-
density traffic area, and individual non-cooperative UAS are most frequently seen in designated UAS 
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airspace. Both of the areas do not press immediate threat and danger to manned aircraft. However, the 
second most possible UAS operation areas for both individual cooperative and non-cooperative UAS 
are the same – at a close proximity to standard flows of aircraft. It is also verified by pilots’ UAS 
experience, which indicates the most highly possible location for individual cooperative and non-
cooperative UAS is at a close range to the pilots’ aircraft (Table 5-8). 
5.5.1.3 Information Needs & Availability  
The top 4 most important UAS information types identified by both air traffic controllers and pilots 
are the same except for slightly different ranking: current altitude, UAS planned maneuvers, type of 
communication links and current track (Figure 5-12, Figure 5-18). It is an indication that these four 
types of information are most critical and essential to both controllers and pilots task performance. 
The fifth most important information is UAS ground speed and UAS heading for controllers and pilots 
respectively. The difference could be a result of different perspectives. Based on the radar 
surveillance display, controllers could tell the track of an aircraft, which gives a general direction of 
movement. In order to accurately assess the situation and maintain successful separation, they need to 
know their speed relative to the ground. For pilots, they need to know the relative movement of 
another aircraft to themselves in order to avoid collisions. 
In terms of information availability, there is quite a difference between controllers and pilots. 
While there are only 4 types of information that are required but not available to controllers (Figure 
14), 10 types are required but not available to pilots (Figure 20). It could be due to the fact that 
current on-board technologies are not sophisticated enough to identify or provide adequate 
information of UAS to pilots. The most needed but not available UAS capability information for both 
controllers and pilots is UAS see-and-avoid capability.  
It has also been found that participants’ real-life UAS experience can influence their information 
requirements (Figure 5-16, 5-17, 5-22, 5-23). Therefore, UAS encounter trainings and UAS 
overviews are necessary in helping operators get familiar with relevant procedures and preparing 
them for potential encounter situations.  
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5.5.1.4 Challenges in Obtaining, Using and Interpreting UAS Information 
The top 5 challenges in obtaining, using and interpreting UAS information identified by controllers 
and pilots are essentially the same. They fall into 5 categories: lack of information, detect and avoid 
capabilities, communication, ability of control/operational requirements and information overload.  
First of all, participants universally indicate a lack of UAS information in operation, including 
altitude, speed, heading, etc. It is possible that the operators are able to see the targets on the display 
without associate information. Secondly, participants are concerned about the capability of current 
technologies (primary and secondary surveillance radar) in detecting UAS. The comments urged an 
exploration and deployment of new technologies like ADS-B. Thirdly, both parties stress on the 
challenge of communication. It includes controller-controller, controller-manned aircraft pilot, 
controller-UAS pilot and manned aircraft pilot-UAS pilot communication. As illustrated by the 
participants, these types of communication could be affected by each party’s cooperativeness, 
situation awareness and workload. Fourth, operators need standardized procedures in handling UAS. 
It could be obtained from training, documentations and regulations, which requires a wider public 
awareness of UAS adoption and operation. Last but not least, adding more information in the system 
imposes the potential of information overload and workload increase. It has to be carefully measured 
and displayed in order to achieve the most effectiveness. 
5.5.1.5 Communication with Shared Information & Information Asynchrony 
Both controllers and pilots agreed that by sharing non-cooperative information with each other would 
increase safety. Situation awareness and workload / communication are listed both as advantages and 
disadvantages of information sharing. Communication, in this sense, is considered as one indicator of 
workload, because more frequent communication would result in a rise of workload.  
Shown in Table 5-15 is a breakdown of situation awareness and workload/communication as 
advantages and disadvantages. For example, 39% of the 33 comments gathered from controller 
participants thought that shared information would improve situation awareness, while 18% of the 34 
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comments gathered from controller participants disagreed
7
. Overall, the information sharing would 
still improve controllers’ situation awareness. 
Similarly, it can be concluded that non-cooperative information sharing could improve controllers 
and pilots’ situation awareness, but it could also increase operators’ workload. 
Other common disadvantages that are shared by controllers and pilots are information overload, 
unexpected maneuvers of pilots and information inaccuracy. Display clutter, which is considered as a 
challenge by the controllers, is considered as part of information overload. It would increase 
operators’ mental workload in disseminating and comprehending the data. Pilots’ unexpected 
maneuvers, as explained by the participants, are what will likely to happen when pilots have access to 
the non-cooperative information. They may not consult with the controllers first and execute 
avoidance maneuvers independently. It would greatly increase the chances of confusion and collision. 
Table 5-15: Interpretation of Situation Awareness and Workload / Communication as both 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
 Controllers Pilots 






























Controllers and pilots’ responses to the maximally acceptable delay time are 20.5 seconds and 
13.64 seconds respectively with median values of 5 and 5 seconds. The maximum differences in 
distance between the actual position of the non-cooperative objects and the position of the non-
cooperative objects shown on the surveillance display are 3.87 NM and 2.06 NM with median values 
of both 1NM. 
                                                     
7
 In the original question, participants were asked to write down up to 3 advantages and 
disadvantages respectively. As not all participants provided 3 advantages or disadvantages, the 
number of responses is unequal. 
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The responses are not exactly the same, but both parties’ perceptions of time and distance are very 
close. A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if the differences in maximum time delay 
between controller and pilots’ was statistically significant. Distribution of the time data for controller 
participants and pilot participants were similar, as assessed by visual inspection. The median time for 
controller participants (5) and pilot participants (5) was not significantly different, U = 144, z = -.438, 
p = .68, using an exact sampling distribution for U.  
Similarly, a Mann-Whitney U test was also run to determine if maximum distance between objects 
on screen and in reality reported by controller participants and pilot participants were significantly 
different from each other. Distribution of the reported distance for controller participants and pilot 
participants were similar, as assessed by visual inspection. Median distance for controller participants 
(1) and pilot participants (1) was not significantly different, U = 153.5, z = - .505, p = .619, using an 
exact sampling distribution for U. 
The results indicated that the controllers and pilots’ perception of possible acceptable time delay 
and maximum difference of distance are very similar. It is possible to use follow-up information 
asynchrony study to identify the thresholds of the acceptable time delay and maximum distance 
difference. 
5.5.2 Survey Design: Lessons Learned 
The survey design process was extensive and a number of lessons have been learned about the 
process. 
Choose the right software. The software used for the design is SurveyGizmo. It is fairly easy to use 
for beginners and is quite versatile in creating different types of questions. However, there are 
potential problems in using tables of checkboxes. Once the question setting is mandatory, there is no 
way to bypass the question unless the participants check every box in the table.  
Use guidelines to support iteration cycles. The survey design is a process of constant iterations, 
gathering feedback and improving the questions. During the iterations, it is quite common that the 
focus of the survey is shifted or overlooked at some point. To minimize the possibility, it is always 
good to have a set of objectives determined prior to the brainstorming session and kept at hand for 
lookup. This set of objectives should act as a guideline throughout the survey design.  
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Cut off the unnecessary questions. During the initial generation of the survey, brainstorm technique 
is used to create a fairly large number of questions. However, not all these questions can be in the 
final version. A careful scrutiny and elimination has to be performed in accordance with the 
objectives. Moreover, the proper format of the questions has to be chosen in the interest of collecting 
quality responses and minimizing response time. 
Handle negative feedback. In the consultation process, professionals from the industry have 
actively participated and shared with us their opinions. During the interaction, some of the feedback 
was very harsh and difficult to take. Yet, it is important for the researchers to be prepared and being 
able to extract useful comments from a large amount of feedback.  
Make necessary tradeoffs. Continuous iterations can undoubtedly improve the overall survey 
quality. However, an executive decision has to be made at the right time to release the survey to avoid 
excessive spending of personnel and resources. 
5.5.3 Future Work 
The analysis presented in the chapter is only a small portion of the entire survey. More work is 
needed in completing a thorough examination of the survey, extracting more insights and forming 
proper design guidelines for the next generation radar surveillance systems.  
5.6 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 5 presents a survey study researching surveillance information level of details, particularly on 
UAS and other non-cooperative objects, which should be presented to the operators. In the interest of 
the thesis, the analysis concentrates on participants’ overall experience with UAS, information 
requirements and information availability and communication ambiguity with the presence of delayed 
information. The results indicated that current UAS operation is a lot more frequent in a wider range 
of area than what was originally expected. It is also confirmed that the integration of UAS into civil 
airspace presents an urgent need of technology improvement in both object detection and information 
transmission. Some of the most needed information includes current UAS altitude, UAS planned 
maneuvers, type of communication links and current UAS track. Yet, not all the required information 
is available to the users in current systems.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion & Implications 
Non-cooperative objects, including birds, weather and UAS, are presenting increasing challenges and 
potential dangers to current airspace operators. With the development of new technologies, it is 
possible to distribute relevant information to air traffic controllers and pilots, which would improve 
the shared situation awareness and provide for safer operations. However, it is unclear as to how the 
display of additional non-cooperative information would affect operators’ communication and 
performance. Motivated by this opportunity, the thesis examined the potential human factors 
challenges in enhanced information distribution, aiming to provide feasible recommendations for 
future radar surveillance systems design. 
6.1 Research Objectives and Key Findings 
The general research goal of the thesis stated at the beginning of Chapter 1 is “to identify the potential 
human factors challenges in the future non-cooperative information distribution process, understand 
how the challenges affect human operators’ performance in the system, and provide guidance for 
future radar surveillance systems design.” 
Five objectives for achieving the research goal were presented in Chapter 1.  They are restated 
below with key results achieved in developing this thesis. 
Objective 1: Create surveillance information distribution model of current ATC environment 
capturing current challenges in handling non-cooperative object surveillance data.  
The first objective was addressed by conducting literature review on current technologies and 
systems handling non-cooperative objects. As identified in Chapter 2, the constraints of current air 
traffic control are that there lacks a reliable and real-time warning / forecasting system to alert 
operators of potential non-cooperative object hazards. The increasingly complex operational 
environment (i.e. the integration of UAS into the airspace) also presses challenges on the system’s 
non-cooperative objects detection and information sharing capabilities.  
The main contribution of the review is that it provided a better understanding of current ATC 
environment, based on which a current information distribution model was created (Figure 3-1) in 
Section 3.1.1 in Chapter 3.  
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Objective 2: Create surveillance information distribution model of future ATC environments 
incorporating emerging technologies relevant to handling non-cooperative object surveillance data. 
The second objective was addressed by conducting a literature review on recent advanced radar 
capabilities and new infrastructure service for information centralization. Section 2.1 and 2.3 in 
Chapter 2 specifically discussed the new capabilities and technologies, including ADS-B, NextGen 
and SWIM. Based on the review, a future surveillance information distribution model was created in 
Section 3.1.2 in Chapter 3 (Figure 3-2). The new model incorporated the core ideas of enabling non-
cooperative object detection and information sharing. The model narrowed the research question and 
provide more detailed context in which human factors challenges was identified in Chapter 3.  
Objective 3: Identify potential human factor challenges in distributing non-cooperative 
information of the expected future surveillance information distribution model. 
The fourth objective was addressed by critically reviewing the non-cooperative information 
distribution process in the future surveillance information distribution model and synthesizing 
literature on related human factors challenges. The four identified human factors challenges are: 
1) Potential for asynchronous information for air traffic controller and pilots; 
2) Displayed information level of detail; 
3) Dissonance and warning integration; and 
4) Information intermittency. 
These challenges were discussed in details in Section 3.2, Chapter 3 on what they are, what the 
potential causes are, what past accomplishments are and how they are related with the future 
surveillance information distribution model. 
Objective 4: Determine how non-equal time delays (HF challenge 1) in the distribution of non-
cooperative object radar surveillance information affects the communication between controller and 
pilot. 
The fourth objective was achieved by designing and conducting an initial experiment of 
information asynchrony with 12 pairs of participants (Chapter 4), and part of an online survey study 
(Chapter 5). In the experiment, the effect of asynchronous information on pilot-controller 
communication was studied by manipulating the delay amount of the shared information between the 
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pilot and controller participants. The results did not fully confirm the hypotheses: an increase of time 
delay would observably, but not statistically significantly increase operators’ communication time; 
the number of clarification statements vary significantly depending on the time delay which was 
found between Delay 0.5 and 10 minutes; and as the amount of delay increases, there was an 
observable but not statistically significant decrease in participants’ performance and communication 
effectiveness and increase in frustration level and perceived trial difficulty level. 
The fifth section of the survey probed pilot-controller communication regarding non-cooperative 
objects. Results showed that sharing non-cooperative object information between controllers and 
pilots was thought to improve operators’ situation awareness while it would also potentially increase 
controllers’ workload. In addition, expected maneuvers from pilots and information overload are also 
considered as disadvantages to information sharing. 
The survey also identified possible acceptable delay time for shared non-cooperative object 
information based on participants’ experience and current operational environment. The time delay 
reported by controller and pilot participants was not significantly different from each other. But, 
experimental studies are needed to validate the accurate thresholds. 
Objective 5: Gather information requirements from air traffic controllers and pilots on individual 
UAS operations (HF challenge 2). 
Finally, the fifth objective was addressed by conducting an online survey study on controllers and 
pilots’ information needs and requirements of UAS (Chapter 5). Fifty-one certified controllers and 
fifty-one certified pilots provided complete responses to the survey. The results revealed that current 
UAS operation is already widely existed. Some critical information of individual / formation of UAS 
with the same dynamics to controllers and pilots’ successful performance includes current altitude, 
UAS planned maneuvers, type of communication links and current tracks. It was also confirmed that 
not all required information is available to the operators. For pilots specifically, the majority of 
needed information is not available in operations. These results should be taken into consideration 
while designing the next generation radar surveillance systems.  
Valuable implications were also drawn from studying challenges in obtaining and interpreting UAS 
information and communication with shared information and information asynchrony. These 
implications include: 
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1) Operators need more information about UAS, including altitude, speed, heading, etc.; 
2) Operators are concerned about current technologies in accurately detecting UAS; 
3) There are potential challenges in effective communication regarding UAS across different 
operators in the system, including controllers, manned aircraft pilots and UAS pilots. 
4) Operators need standardized procedures in handling UAS. It should be accessible from training 
and / or documentation; 
5) Adding more information in the system should not greatly increase operators’ information 
overload and decrease situation awareness. 
6.2 Contributions 
There are several major contributions of the thesis. First, information asynchrony of non-cooperative 
objects has an overall negative effect on operators’ communication and performance. Although no 
statistical significance was found in operators’ communication on time delay, a consistency between 
the subjective and objective measurements was demonstrated. Although there were observable trends 
of the time delay effect on subjective measurements, no meaningful statistical significance was found. 
However, in order to improve the overall collaboration performance and shared situation awareness, 
the system design should still economically minimize the delay as much as possible. 
Secondly, the survey results challenge current perception of the limited frequency of UAS 
operations. There are more controllers and pilots who have had encountered UAS one way or another 
in their daily tasks than what was originally expected. It is therefore urgent for the authorities and 
researchers to speed up the development of comprehensive UAS operation regulations and more 
advanced detecting technologies. 
Thirdly, the survey also helped identify operational information requirements and availabilities for 
individual / formation of UAS with the same dynamics, and challenges in sharing non-cooperative 
object information. Some of the most needed UAS information includes current UAS altitude, UAS 
planned maneuvers, type of communication links and current UAS track. However, not all of the 
needed information is available to the operators. Moreover, it should be taken into consideration that 
by providing more information, it introduces the potential of information overload. Thus, the choice 
of what information to be displayed to the operators should be based on a more comprehensive 
investigation, preferably in an experiment form. 
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6.3 Recommendations and Future Work 
The asynchrony experiment presented in the thesis is an initial approach to understanding the effect of 
information asynchrony on pilot-controller communication. It is recommended that future work 
continue investigating the topic in a more dynamic environment with subject matter experts as 
participants. It is believed that an elimination of artificial flaws and a shorten time delay would lead 
to a more satisfying and significant result. However, the findings so far should also inspire 
surveillance system design. That is, the amount of delay on shared information should be as small as 
possible to ensure overall effective collaboration. Understanding that zero delay can be unrealistically 
difficult and expensive to achieve, future work should find a middle ground and identify an 
acceptable threshold of the delay that would not affect operators’ normal performance.  
UAS integration into controlled airspace appears to be inevitable. The survey study provided in-
depth knowledge of current UAS operations. The fact that UAS operations are more prevalent than 
expected highlights an urgent need to address the related operational regulation issues. Although the 
results of the survey provided first-hand data on what information of UAS is needed, adding these 
information to the surveillance systems should be validated by experimental studies. The challenges 
of current surveillance systems in detecting non-cooperative objects and enabling information sharing 
between pilots and controllers should be addressed in the next-generation radar surveillance systems 
to better facilitate users’ needs. 
There are still many more insights to be extracted from the survey study. The analysis presented in 
the thesis is only a small part of it that is most relevant to the focus of the thesis. It is recommended 
that future research continue analyzing the data collected from Section 3, 4 and 6 of the survey. It 
would provide invaluable information about the formation of UAS operation and related information 
presentation methods in surveillance systems. 
In Chapter 3, 4 human factors challenges were identified, and the thesis only addressed two of 
them. It is highly recommended that future research continue investigating the other two challenges – 
dissonance and warning integration and information intermittency. It would provide additional 
guidance in understanding how these challenges affect operators’ performance. The results would 
also provide rich implications as to how the next-generation radar surveillance system should be 
designed to best facilitate human operators’ performance and requirements. 
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